Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [136]
Tony Parsons and Nico Henderson were both closely involved in the drafting. We went over every point in detail, working as usual around the oblong table in the Great Parlour upstairs, remodelling the draft clause by clause. At hand were voluminous reference sources on the UN and the law relating to the administration of the Falklands. We hardened our terms in respect of interim administration, ensuring something close to self-government for the islanders and denying any role to the Argentine Government. We excluded South Georgia and the other dependencies from the proposals altogether: South Georgia was back under British control and there could be no question any longer of including it in the negotiations. We made reference to Article 73 of the UN Charter, which implies self-determination, to make it clear that the wishes of the islanders would be paramount in long-term negotiations. The Argentine Government was required to give a response within 48 hours and there was to be no negotiation of the terms. This exercise also allowed me subsequently to explain each phrase to the House of Commons to allay their understandable fears that we might be prepared to yield too much.
To keep the US informed and supportive at the UN — which was crucial — I authorized Francis Pym to brief Al Haig about our proposals that evening. This was a wise decision; when Mr Haig read the text he described it as fair. The Secretary-General of the UN also seemed impressed by the flexibility which we had shown.
I myself was closely involved in our intense diplomatic effort to keep our support on the eve of what I knew would be decisive military action. It was most important that the European Community countries should continue their sanctions against Argentina, but a number of them were faltering. I telephoned the Italian Foreign minister on Sunday afternoon, though to little avail.
WEEK EIGHT
On Monday 17 May President Mitterrand was in London for talks and I was able to press the argument for sanctions with him. The same afternoon I telephoned Mr Haughey about the Irish position. I was not convinced that this would have much impact, but the effort had to be made. In fact the Community Foreign ministers, meeting in Luxemburg, decided to continue with sanctions on a ‘voluntary’ basis, which was less than ideal but much better than nothing.
On the morning of Tuesday 18 May the War Cabinet met with all the Chiefs of Staff. It was perhaps the crucial moment. We had to decide whether to go ahead with the landing on the Falklands; I asked each Service Chief to give his views. The discussion was very open and the difficulties were clear: we would be vulnerable on landing and, in particular, there were doubts whether we had enough air cover, given that British ships would be within easy range of Argentine attack from the mainland and their positions would be known. We had not been able to knock out as many Argentine ships or aircraft as we would have liked in the weeks before the landing. And always there was the fact that we had not been able to locate their submarines.
But it was also clear that the longer the delay, the greater the risk of losses and the worse the condition of our troops when they had to fight. The troops could not remain on board ship indefinitely. Of course, no one could quantify casualties, but the judgement was that the advantages of landing outweighed the risks of postponement. The rules of engagement had already been agreed. The attack would be by night.
None of us now doubted what must be done. We authorized the landing on the basis of the Force Commander’s plan, subject to the Cabinet’s final approval. It could be stopped any time until