Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [137]
There was no lack of last-minute pressure for further diplomatic concessions. Michael Foot had written to me urging further negotiations. I replied that if we could not reach agreement with the Argentinians on terms we regarded as acceptable we would have to decide what further military action to take and we would answer for our decisions to the House of Commons. Mr Haig too had to be discouraged from bringing forward another set of proposals which would just have allowed the Argentines to go on buying time. In fact, on the next day, Wednesday, we received the Argentine response, which was in effect a comprehensive rejection of our proposals. I had never thought they would accept. Our proposals were now taken off the table. We had decided earlier — at Francis Pym’s suggestion — that following Argentine rejection we would publish them, and we did so on 20 May. This was the first time during the whole of the diplomatic manoeuvring that either side had made public their actual negotiating position and our terms created a good international impression.
The Secretary-General made a last-minute attempt in messages to me and General Galtieri to put forward his own proposals. On Thursday morning (20 May) the War Cabinet met before the full Cabinet. Once again, Francis urged a compromise, and this time at the eleventh hour. He suggested that the Secretary-General’s aide-mémoire was very similar to our own proposals and that it would not be understood if we now went ahead with military measures. But the fact was that Sr. de Cuellar’s proposals were sketchy and unclear; to have accepted would have put us right back at the beginning again. I summed up very firmly. There could be no question of holding up the military timetable. It could be fatal for our forces. If the weather was right the landing would go ahead. The War Cabinet and later the full Cabinet agreed.
The Secretary-General had received no reply from the Argentinians about his aide-mémoire — on which we, in spite of all our reservations, had offered serious comments. He admitted the failure of his efforts to the Security Council. We published our proposals and I defended them in the House of Commons that afternoon. The debate went well and provided a good background for what now had to happen.
I had a full day of engagements in my constituency on Friday 21 May and I knew how important it was to carry on with business as usual. Before lunch I had to open a large extension of Gersons’, a firm which specializes in storage, packaging and overseas removals. There was a military band and an audience of some 1200, including many ambassadors. I was deeply moved, partly by the pride and patriotism of the people there but also, of course, because I knew (as they could not) what was due to happen at that very moment 8000 miles away. I did all that one has to do on these occasions and even rode on a fork-lift truck. Then I rushed back to the constituency office to see if there was any news. Not yet. I never telephoned Northwood on this or any other occasion to find out about operations in progress. I knew that the commanders on the spot had more important things to do than answer unnecessary enquiries from London. I returned to the Finchley office again soon after 5 p.m. and learnt by telephone and in carefully obscure language that events were taking place, but no detail.
Later that evening, while I was at a reception in Woodhouse School, still in the constituency, the news came over on the television. The Union Jack was flying in San Carlos: we had returned to the Falklands.
But I was desperately anxious about casualties. Was it really possible that we could land on that hostile coast with a fleet full of troops and equipment without being detected?
Later that night I returned to No. 10 and John Nott brought me a full report.