Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [322]
Though I was genuinely hurt and dismayed by the behaviour I had witnessed, I was not displeased with the outcome. In particular, I was glad that the Commonwealth heads of government endorsed an idea with which several of us had been toying — the sending of a group of ‘eminent persons’ to South Africa to report back on the situation to a future conference. This had the great merit of giving us time — both to press the South Africans for further reform and to fight the diplomatic battle. I sought to persuade Geoffrey Howe to be an ‘eminent person’ but he was most reluctant to do so. He probably rated its chances of success as poor, and events proved him right. I may, myself, have been less than tactful. For when he protested that he was Foreign Secretary and could not do both jobs, I said that I could just about cope with his as well while he was away. Since by now I was firmly in charge of our approach to South Africa, making the main decisions directly from No. 10, that may have been close to the bone. One advantage of those eventually chosen as members of the ‘Eminent Persons Group’ was that a distinguished black African, the Nigerian General Obasanjo, would act as chairman of the group and would see for himself what the reality of life in South Africa was. But this advantage was more than cancelled out by the problems created by Malcolm Fraser, still full of rancour at his election defeat by Bob Hawke, longing to achieve a high international profile once more and consequently making a thoroughly ‘eminent person’ of himself.
At the press conference after the summit I described, with complete accuracy, the concessions I had made on sanctions as ‘tiny’, which enraged the Left and undoubtedly irritated the Foreign Office. But I did not believe in sanctions and I was not prepared to justify them. I was able to leave the shores of Nassau with my policy intact, albeit with my personal relations with Commonwealth leaders somewhat bruised: but that, after all, was not entirely my fault. And there were thousands of black Africans who would keep their jobs because of the battle I had fought.
More arguments about sanctions in the EC and the Commonwealth
I had no illusions that I had succeeded in doing anything more at Nassau than stave off for the present the pressure for sanctions against South Africa. It remained to be seen what would come of the ‘eminent persons’ visit to southern Africa. In fact it was an unmitigated disaster. Whether to scupper the initiative or for quite unconnected reasons, the South African armed forces launched raids against African National Congress (ANC) bases in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the EPG cut short their visit.
This gave me a very difficult hand to play at the European Council meeting at the Hague in June 1986 — and because the actions of European Community countries, unlike most Commonwealth members, could have a real impact on the South African economy this was at least as important a forum for the sanctions issue as was CHOGM. The Dutch themselves — the Netherlands having been the original home of the Afrikaners — suffered from a pervasive guilt complex about South Africa, which did not make them ideal chairmen. But Chancellor Kohl — who, at least at this stage, was as strongly opposed to sanctions as I was — led the debate. I supported him, followed by the Prime Minister of Portugal. In the end we agreed to consider introducing later in the year a ban on new investment and sanctions on imports of South African coal, iron, steel and krugerrands. But it was also agreed that Geoffrey Howe should, as a sort of lone ‘eminent person’ and in view of the fact that Britain would shortly be taking on the presidency of the Community, visit South Africa to press for reform