Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [323]
Geoffrey was extremely reluctant to go and it must be said that his reluctance proved justified since he was insulted by President Kaunda and brushed off by President Botha. I later learned that he thought I had set him up for an impossible mission and was deeply angry about it. I can only say that I had no such intention. I had a real admiration for Geoffrey’s talent for quiet diplomacy. If anyone could have made a breakthrough he would have done it.
Shortly after Geoffrey’s return I had to face the Special Commonwealth Conference on South Africa which we had agreed at Lyford Cay to review progress. It had been decided that seven Commonwealth heads of governments would meet in London in August. The worst aspect was that because of President P.W. Botha’s obstinacy we did not have enough to show by way of progress since the Nassau CHOGM. There had been some significant reforms and the partial state of emergency had been lifted in March. But a nationwide state of emergency had been imposed in June, Mr Mandela was still in prison, and the ANC and other similar organizations were still banned. With the fiasco of the ‘Eminent Persons Group’ in addition, there was no prospect of peaceful political dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. The US Congress was exerting increasing pressure for tough sanctions and later in the year forced a change in the Administration’s policy by overruling President Reagan’s veto on a new sanctions bill. It was clear that I would have to come up with some modest package of measures, though whether this would arrest the march towards full-scale economic sanctions was doubtful. In any case, I had a little list. For use as a diplomatic weapon of a rather different kind I had another little list of Commonwealth countries which applied detention without trial and similar illiberal practices — just in case.
The media and the Opposition were by now quite obsessive about South Africa. There was talk of the Commonwealth breaking up if Britain did not change its position on sanctions, though there was never any likelihood of either event. I was always convinced — and my postbag showed — that the views and priorities of these commentators were quite unrepresentative of what the general public felt. But that did not make it any more pleasant. On the eve of the conference Denis and I visited Edinburgh where the Commonwealth Games were to be held. We went to see the competitors — those at least whose countries had not boycotted the event — in the Games ‘village’, to be met by a few catcalls and some sour criticism. I did not disagree with Denis when he remarked that this was ‘one of the most poisonous visits’ we had ever made. It was a relief to dine that evening with my good friend Laurens van der Post who talks good sense about South Africa and who had been very helpful when we were negotiating independence for Zimbabwe.
Then it was back to more irrationality as the Special Conference opened in London. My meetings with heads of government before the official opening filled me with gloom. Brian Mulroney urged me to have Britain ‘give a lead’ and seemed to want me to reveal my negotiating hand to him in advance: but this I had no intention of doing, having on many an occasion seen such ‘concessions’ pocketed and then immediately forgotten. Kenneth Kaunda was in a thoroughly self-righteous and unco-operative frame of mind when I dropped in to see him at his hotel. He predicted that if sanctions were not applied, South Africa would go up in flames. I wound up the meeting smartly and said that it would be better if we postponed our discussion. Later I told Rajiv Gandhi that I would be prepared to move ‘a little’ at the conference. He seemed rather more amenable than he had been at Nassau, as indeed he usually was in private.
In fact, the formal discussions were every bit as unpleasant as at Lyford Cay, though at least they were shorter. My refusal to go along with the sanctions they wanted was attacked by Messrs Kaunda, Mugabe,