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Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [526]

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it to John MacGregor.

I now know that this was the time when other ministers back in London were preparing to abandon my cause. But I knew nothing of that when I went to bed late that Tuesday night. My first inkling of what was taking place came the next morning when my Private Office told me that in accordance with my request they had telephoned Peter Lilley — a card-carrying Thatcherite whom I had appointed to succeed Nick Ridley at Trade and Industry in July 1990 — to ask him to help with the drafting of my speech for that Thursday’s No Confidence debate. Peter had apparently replied that he saw no point in this because I was finished. Coming from such a source, this upset me more than I can say. It was going to be even more difficult than I had imagined in my worst nightmares.


CONSULTATIONS ON RETURN TO DOWNING STREET

I arrived at No. 10 just before midday (Wednesday 21 November). At Peter Morrison’s suggestion, I had agreed that I should see members of the Cabinet one by one on my return. The arrangements were made as soon as I got back to London where first appearances were deceptive. The staff of No. 10 clapped and cheered as I arrived; a thousand red roses had arrived from one supporter; and as the long day wore on a constantly increasing flow of other bouquets lined every corridor and staircase.

I went straight up to the flat to see Denis. Affection never blunted honesty between us. His advice was that I should withdraw. ‘Don’t go on, love,’ he said. But I felt in my bones that I should fight on. My friends and supporters expected me to fight, and I owed it to them to do so as long as there was a chance of victory. But was there?

After a few minutes I went down to the study with Peter Morrison where Norman Tebbit and John Wakeham soon joined us. Norman gave me his assessment. He said that it was very difficult to know how my vote stood with MPs, but many would fight every inch of the way for me. My biggest area of weakness was among Cabinet ministers. The objective must be to stop Michael Heseltine, and Norman thought I had the best chance of doing so. I was quite frank with him in return. I said that if I could see the Gulf crisis through and inflation brought down, I would be able to choose the time of my departure. In retrospect, I can see this was a kind of code assuring them that I would resign not long after the next election.

But we had to consider other possibilities. If Michael Heseltine was unthinkable, who could best stop him? Neither Norman nor I believed that Douglas could beat Michael. Moreover, much though I admired Douglas’s character and ability, and grateful as I was to him for his loyalty, I doubted whether he would carry on the policies in which I believed. And that was a vital consideration to me — it was, indeed, the consideration that prompted me to look favourably on John Major. What of him? If I withdrew, would he be able to win? His prospects were, at best, still uncertain. So I concluded that the right option was for me to stay in the fight.

John Wakeham said that we should think about the wider meeting just about to start. I should prepare myself for the argument that I would be humiliated if I fought. It was the first time I was to hear the argument that day; but not the last. John, himself, was inclined to reject this logic — he said that one was never humiliated by fighting for what one believed in — at least while it was still hypothetical.

Norman, John, Peter and I then went down to the Cabinet Room where we were joined by Ken Baker, John MacGregor, Tim Renton, Cranley Onslow and John Moore. Ken opened the discussion by saying that the key issue was how to stop Michael Heseltine. In his view, I was the only person who could do this. Douglas Hurd did not want the job badly enough, and in any case he represented the old wing of the Party. John Major would attract more support: he was closer to my views and had few enemies, but he was short of experience. Ken said that two things were needed for my victory: my campaign needed a major overhaul and I must give an undertaking

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