Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [527]
John MacGregor then spoke. He said that he had done his trawl of Cabinet ministers who in turn had consulted their junior ministers. He said that there were very few who were proposing to shift their allegiance, but the underlying problem was that they had no faith in my ultimate success. They were concerned that my support was eroding. In fact, I subsequently learnt that this was not the full picture. John MacGregor had found a large minority of Cabinet ministers whose support was shaky — either because they actually wanted me out, or because they genuinely believed that I could not beat Michael Heseltine, or because they favoured an alternative candidate. He did not feel able to convey this information frankly in front of Tim Renton, or indeed of Cranley Onslow, and he had not managed to contact me with this information in advance. This was important because if we had known the true picture earlier in the day, we might have thought twice about asking Cabinet ministers individually for their support.
The discussion continued. Tim Renton gave a characteristically dispiriting assessment. He said that the Whips’ Office had received many messages from back-benchers and ministers saying that I should withdraw from the contest. They doubted if I could beat Michael Heseltine and they wanted a candidate around whom the Party could unite. He said that the trend was worsening, but conceded that with the vote five days away support could be won back by a better focused campaign fought by the younger members.
But then came the rest of his message. He said that Willie Whitelaw had asked to see him. Willie was worried that I might be humiliated in the second ballot — it was touching that so many people seemed to be worried about my humiliation — and feared that even if I won by a small margin, it would be difficult for me to unite the Party. He did not want to be cast in the role of a ‘man in a grey suit’. But, if asked, he would come in and see me ‘as a friend’.
Cranley Onslow then gave his assessment. He said that he brought no message from the committee that I should stand down — the reverse, if anything, was true; but nor did they wish to convey any message to Michael Heseltine. In effect, with the ballot going ahead and the result uncertain, the ‘22 was declaring its neutrality. Cranley gave his own view that the quality of a Heseltine administration would be inferior to one led by me. As for issues, he did not believe that Europe was the main one: it would not be crucial in a general election. Most people were worried about the community charge and he hoped that something substantial could be done about that. I intervened to say that I could not pull rabbits out of a hat in five days. John MacGregor supported me: I could not now credibly promise a radical overhaul of the community charge, no matter how convenient it seemed.
John Wakeham said that the big issue was whether there was a candidate with a better chance of beating Michael Heseltine. He saw no sign of this. Everything, therefore, hung on strengthening my campaign which could only succeed if all my colleagues fought hard for me. Both Ken Baker and John Moore gave their views about the people I needed to win over. Ken noted that those who feared that I could not win were my strongest supporters — people like Norman Lamont, John Gummer, Michael Howard and Peter Lilley. John Moore stressed that I needed complete commitment from ministers, particularly junior ministers, in order to succeed. Norman Tebbit came in at the end. Like Cranley, he believed that Europe had faded as an issue in the leadership campaign: the only other major policy issue was the community charge where Michael’s promise of action was proving particularly attractive to MPs from the North-West. In spite of this, however, Norman declared firmly that I could carry more votes against Michael, provided that most of my senior colleagues swung behind me.
The message of the meeting, even from those urging me to fight