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By Root 3098 0

of the television cameras. Of the 19 hostages known to be alive at the time of the assault all were rescued. Four gunmen were killed; one was captured; none escaped. I breathed a sigh of relief when I learned that there were no police or SAS casualties. Later I went to the Regent’s Park Barracks to congratulate our men. I was met by Peter de la Billière, the SAS commander, and then watched what had happened on television news, with a running commentary, punctuated by relieved laughter, from those involved in the assault. One of them turned to me and said, ‘we never thought you’d let us do it.’ Wherever I went over the next few days, I sensed a great wave of pride at the outcome; telegrams of congratulation poured in from abroad: we had sent a signal to terrorists everywhere that they could expect no deals and would extort no favours from Britain.

The Middle East continued to occupy my attention throughout the rest of 1980. At the European Council in Venice on 12 and 13 June the heads of government discussed Israel and the Palestinian question. The key issue was whether the Community governments were to call for the PLO to be ‘associated with’ the Middle East peace talks, or to ‘participate in’ them: I was very much against the latter course, for as long as the PLO did not reject terrorism. In fact, the final communiqué reflected what seemed to me the right balance: it reaffirmed the right of all the states in the region — including Israel — to existence and security, but also demanded justice for all peoples, which implied recognition of of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. So, of course, it pleased no one.

Then the Middle East focus shifted again. In September 1980 Iraq attacked Iran and we were once again in the throes of a new crisis, with potentially dangerous political and economic implications for western interests. Saddam Hussein had decided that the chaos in Iran provided him with a good opportunity to renounce the 1975 Algiers Settlement of the two countries’ disputed claims to the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and seize it by force.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war Peter Carrington came over to Chequers to discuss the situation with me. I was chiefly concerned to prevent the conflict spreading down the Gulf and involving the vulnerable oil-rich Gulf States, which had traditionally close links with Britain. I told Peter that I did not share the common view that the Iranians would quickly be beaten. They were fanatical fighters and had an effective airforce with which they could attack oil installations. I was right: by the end of the year and after initial successes, the Iraqis became bogged down and the war threatened both the stability of the Gulf and western shipping. But by this time we had put in the Armilla Patrol to protect our ships.

As I looked back on the international scene that Christmas of 1980 at Chequers, I reflected that the successes of British foreign policy had helped us through a particularly dark and difficult time in domestic, and particularly economic, affairs. But as in economic matters so in foreign affairs I knew that we were only starting the course. Tackling Britain’s Community budget problem was only the first step to reforming the Community’s finances. Bringing Rhodesia to legal independence was but a prelude to addressing the problem of South Africa. The West’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would have to be a fundamental rethinking of our relations with the communist bloc and this had barely begun. The renewed instability in the Gulf as a result of Iraq’s attack on Iran would ultimately require a new commitment by the western powers to the security of the region. All these issues were to dominate British foreign policy in the years ahead.

* North Sea oil would soon give Britain an exceptional position among the major industrial powers, as we became a net oil exporter; but, of course, international recession would hit the markets for our industries: we were, therefore, not immune to the international consequences of the oil price rise.

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