Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [66]
On 10 December the BSC Board confirmed that 52,000 steel jobs would have to go. The business prospects for BSC were still worsening. Indeed, when we looked at their figures for future steel demand we thought that they were, if anything, slightly optimistic. But again, there was no intention to set our judgement against that of the Board and management. Even before the strike, we had been searching for a successor to the present Chairman, Sir Charles Villiers, whose contract was due shortly to come to an end. We had already received seven or eight firm refusals from suitable candidates and it was clear that fear of government interference was one of the main deterrents.
It was difficult to be sure about the outcome of the strike. BSC, the private steel producers and the steel users all had healthy levels of stocks. The fact that the steel users and stockholders were effectively given three weeks’ notice of the strike allowed them to build up stockpiles. Moreover, because of the depressed state of industry many steel-using companies were operating well below capacity. But, on the other hand, there would be serious problems for the users of tin plate, and possibly for the car industry, and the situation could, of course, rapidly worsen if dockers and transport workers took effective action to stop steel moving around the country and to halt imports. However, BSC and its workforce would suffer most. Its current prices were already above those of our European competitors and the domestic market for steel was likely to be lost permanently to foreign steel companies which could ensure a reliable supply in the future.
From the end of December I chaired regular meetings of a small group of ministers and officials to monitor the steel situation and decide what action needed to be taken. It was a frustrating and anxious time. The details of the BSC offer were not well understood either by the steel workers or by the public. BSC did little to explain its position. It would not put out broadsheets or buy newspaper space, on the ground that such actions might be seen as provocative. The hope was that other pressures could be brought to bear on the ISTC and the National Union of Boilermakers (NUB). Moreover, in a misguided attempt to canvass support for various pay offers which they had made, BSC allowed a bewildering array of different figures to gain currency, pleasing no one: to the general public the figures always seemed to be increasing, while to the unions they never seemed sufficient.
For its part, the ISTC was more conscious of pay settlements to other groups of workers — the ‘going rate’ — than it was of the bleak commercial realities of the industry in which its members worked. On 28 November Ford workers had voted to accept a 21.5 per cent wage increase. On 5 December coal miners had accepted a 20 per cent settlement — and been publicly praised for their moderation. All this undoubtedly added to the strength of feeling among the steelmen. On 7 January Len Murray and Bill Sirs asked for a settlement of 8 per cent plus 5 per cent ‘on account’ for the local productivity deals. BSC offered 8 per cent plus 4 per cent in advance for a limited period. The next day negotiations collapsed. The General and Municipal Workers’ Union (GMWU) joined the strike; on the following day the craftsmen struck, and although on 10 February the craft union leaders accepted a separate settlement of 10 per cent plus 4 per cent, later that week its members rejected the offer. In the meantime, on 16 January, the ISTC had spread the strike to the private steel sector, where the uncertain legal position and the violent mass picketing added to our difficulties.
It became clear to me fairly early on, however, that the steel strike was not going to bring British industry to a halt. At my strategy meeting on 18 January the figures showed that the strike