Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [34]
Neither Bruce nor Massey saw any cause for amusement and they educated Waterson, who had not been there to witness it first-hand, on his pre-war performance. Among the worst incidents they highlighted was in April 1939 during the Prague crisis when 'the door mouse [sic]', as he was known, had apparently fallen asleep while sitting next to Chamberlain at a meeting. The South African was a quick leaner and developed a special dislike for the returning minister, 'a charming old man, brave and tenacious of character but legal minded and stereotyped to a degree' who delivered bad news 'like a newspaper reporter'. He was 'fatuous' and 'ineffective' and 'an insult to the Dominions as Secretary of State'. The Canadian high commissioner claimed not to dislike Caldecote personally, but he was also not happy that the senior DO role should be given as 'a consolation prize' to 'a second rate politician' but 'a good Party man'. Massey was prepared to admit, following the first meeting that 'he was more alert and more on the job than we had feared', so much so that he was willing to give him another chance. His deputy, Pearson, nonetheless remained sure that the appointment was the clearest of indications as to how the Dominions' portfolio was viewed within the Cabinet. Bruce was generally much angrier, complaining to Canberra that 'a discarded Lord Chancellor' had been appointed, a politician who 'did not possess the personality or drive necessary to put over Dominion views' and did not have 'a receptive or constructive mind'. MacDonald or the elderly Lloyd George would both have been much better appointments in his view.21
The business of war, now a very real one in which the German menace was no longer merely a matter of speculation, brought with it remarkably few changes in terms of how the administrative machinery of the alliance functioned. There was still considerable concern among the more junior partners about the paucity of information they were receiving and demands that improvements be made. The high commissioners complained about the 'volume and quality of the DW telegrams' but the FO remained resistant to letting them see more arguing that it would be folly to send the Dominions 'every alarmist rumour that we may receive' but the DO was strident with its view that more needed to be done.22 There was a growing feeling, both within the department and in the overseas high commissions, that too little rather than too much was being sent, and that more was needed both of a better quality and not out of date.23 Soothing words were soon exchanged between the two departments but it was regretfully understood within the DO's ranks that the FO would continue to tightly control the distribution of information.24 Simply put, Cadogan could not be moved from his view that nothing should be sent that might perplex the Dominions or, much worse, 'leave them to infer that we are perplexed'.25
Menzies' complaints about the lack of detail contained within the reviews of Allied operations and strategy being sent to him showed that there clearly remained obvious shortcomings.26 News that the French position might soon collapse led the Australian leader to conclude this must have been a sudden development as he had