Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [35]
Within Whitehall the increased tempo of the war was beginning to tell, most noticeably in the DO. Aside from its general day-to-day responsibilities and almost hourly requests from the Antipodean Dominions for strategic appreciations of the situation, there were new tasks for the department to handle, such as finalizing what might happen were an invasion to take place.29 For at least one of the British high commissioners serving in the Dominions, the 'badly overworked department' seemed to be suffering from 'a want of correlation'.30 With Lord Halifax continuing to extol the merits of a possible negotiated settlement with Germany, Menzies joined in beginning what would prove to be the first of three attempts made by him to initiate a 'peace' initiative involving the United States.31 The position was further complicated by the WO's confirmation that Italy would soon enter the war on Germany's side.32 This carried wide strategic considerations both for Britain's Middle East and Far East positions.33 Constitutional concerns also had to be taken into account in light of the brush with neutrality in Cape Town the previous year with the DO's legal experts rushing to revise the procedure by which the Dominions might declare war.34
For the Dominions' representatives based in London, their attention remained firmly focused on the implications of France's demise. Their anger had not abated nor had their belief that they were being ignored and under-utilized. So meagre did they believe the information from the official channels to be that they had even taken to attending the Canadian Military Headquarters on a daily basis where it was believed they could better track developments. Bruce thought it 'criminal' that the War Cabinet had failed to fully consider the implications of a possible French collapse, leaving him with 'a most gloomy view of British prospects'. The seven-page note which he produced and sent to the already over-worked Churchill proposing an international conference to arrange a peace settlement was, not surprisingly, very poorly received.35 Following the British prime minister's visit to the front in mid-June and his report back that the French had fallen back on 'what must be regarded as their last line', the Australian high commissioner and his colleagues emboldened themselves to make a daring move.36 They had become aware that the chiefs of staff had in fact prepared reports on how to respond to France's surrender and the request was made that they be allowed to read them. It was Caldecote who delivered this to the War Cabinet, warning his colleagues that the Dominion governments 'must be treated as full partners and their assent must not be taken for granted'. Two days later the documents were made available for inspection, but they did not make for pleasant reading as within them the degree to which British forces could be sent to the Far East immediately following a Japanese attack was