Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [36]
Menzies appeared to be badly unnerved by the knowledge of the revised British military position. Earlier in the year Britain's official figure in Canberra had told the DO the Australian had 'no more backbone than a jellyfish' and this now seemed to be much more obvious to those watching from London. His insistence that, should Hitler suggest terms on which he would be prepared to conclude peace with the Allies the United States be approached for guidance, 'no matter what form it might take', was a cause of some dismay. Twenty-four hours later, however, in a note to his high commissioner in London, he stated that he was willing to follow Britain 'whatever sacrifice victory may demand'. The news that in any Franco-German peace agreement French possessions in the Pacific might be allotted to Japan had him once again desperately looking towards Washington for assistance. The DO could do little to calm him beyond thank him for his comments and pass on a report prepared by the FO which discounted the idea that the German leader would submit a renewed peace proposal at this time. A message, written in Churchill's name, was also prepared which was intended to instil in the Australian leader some greater measure of resolve.37 Canberra's reaction was all in marked contrast to the reassurances coming out of Wellington where the government officially renewed its pledge of 'every form of assistance within our power'. The authorities in London were informed discretely, however, that there had been considerable political dismay that the long-standing premise of British assistance was now no longer guaranteed. The DO promised that there would be a review were the position in the Far East to become 'threatening' and this seemed to provide some measure of comfort.38 Indeed the New Zealanders now seemed determined on a public display of its loyalty to Britain. An offer to send a special mission to Washington to try and secure support was politely declined in the face of FO concerns that this would be seized upon by isolationists on the other side of the Atlantic.39
Smuts' encouraging comments also continued to provide considerable comfort to Churchill.40 With preparations to repel the now anticipated German invasion intensifying, he felt that there were pressing matters to be considered elsewhere. This included Operation Catapult, the 'necessary' attack against the French fleet anchored at Oran. Carried out by the Royal Navy in the first week of July, it was welcome by the South African leader as being both an end to France's agony and the beginning of efforts to restore it and its 'sick people' through some much-needed and no doubt British-administered 'moral nursing'.41 This significant military operation and Churchill's offer of a union with France made the month before were not revealed to the respective Dominion governments in advance, despite the much wider political ramifications both held. The prime minister, during his celebrated 'Finest Hour' speech had told the House of Commons the opposite. The self-governing Dominions were 'absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland' but more to the point, he claimed that they were being kept fully informed of events.42 In both cases it had been true that very few British officials had been informed in advance but the incredulity over these claims within the DO was serious and Inskip allegedly threatened to resign in protest.43 The reason behind his anger was well put by one of the department's most capable members.
It would be impossible for any of the Dominions to hide the fact that they had not been contacted in advance, leaving them insulted and humiliated in their home parliaments, as such omissions offered the clearest proof 'that so called Dominion autonomy was a mockery'.44 These decisions were in fact for the most part accepted within the Dominion capitals with good grace, it being understood that