Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [37]
Anxieties worsened either side of the Tasman, however, with closer study of the chiefs of staff 'certain eventuality' reports assessing the impact of France's surrender. Adding to the mounting tension were the reports of Japanese demands made at the end of June 1940 for the closure of the Burma Road, the only route still open to supply the Chinese government in Chungking. Sir Robert Craigie, Britain's ambassador in Tokyo, warned that war was probable unless this was carried out. The British military's chiefs concurred that failure to comply could only result in further disaster at this point and Menzies vehemently agreed.45 Batterbee, reading the correspondence in Wellington, found it tragic that 'egged on by Bruce' Australia's leader should adopt 'so weak and defeatist an attitude'; his counterpart in Canberra could meanwhile only despair that 'Australia was still fast asleep' in terms of its war effort.46 The high commissioners in London were, however, of a similar mind to Menzies, urging 'retreat and concessions' from the DO and making daily representations to Inskip that some form of settlement should be reached. Bruce even argued that there could be 'full and frank negotiations' with the Soviets but Whitehall's assurances that the Japanese authorities were likely to accept a proposal of a three month closure appeared to calm some of the worst fears.47
During the summer of 1940 the Dominion representatives—Jordan noticeable by his continuing absences—had continued to make every effort to secure a more prominent role in the direction of policy.48 Only hours after Marshal Petain, France's third leader in as many months, had signed the armistice with Germany, Halifax had been obliged to apologize for not being able to see two of them.49 Caldecote had, at the same time, put in a request that Churchill himself might discuss recent events with them.50 This was approved but in almost the same breath the prime minister informed his Dominions secretary that he would subsequently only be required to attend the War Cabinet on just two days a week, when the chiefs of staff also visited. This drew an astonished Waterson to bitterly complain that 'the PM clearly did not understand the part the high commissioners were playing'.51 In late July Churchill finally met with the group for an hour-long discussion devoted entirely to events in the Far East. He told them that the agreement over the Burma Road had been made to gain time in the hope that a stronger American stance would emerge in the Pacific in the interim. He could also refer to Catapult which had freed British ships to proceed east for the protection of Australian waters should they be needed.52 The South African attendee seemed sufficiently impressed by the encounter to note privately that their host was 'the man for the moment', his approach 'reflecting the purpose and spirit of the people'; it was clear though that he still did not really like him.53 The Dominion leaders were less easily persuaded, and Churchill was warned that neither Australia nor New Zealand would permit the imminent despatch of troop convoys intended for the Middle East unless they were first supplied with a detailed Far Eastern appreciation.54 The next day Halifax met again with the Dominion high commissioners to talk at length about the War Cabinet's most recent discussions, outlining what alternatives he felt existed in the Far East.55 Following this and the promise that an appreciation of the situation would be sent to the Dominion capitals in early August, even Bruce was willing to say that Australia would now be prepared to support 'a policy of standing up to Japan', a remarkable change in light of some of his earlier comments.56
Standing in front of the House of Lords in mid-August 1940, Caldecote outlined how the war was progressing just three days after the first Imperial defeat and the evacuation of the garrison of British Somaliland in the face of an overwhelming Italian invading