Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [42]
It might have been politically expedient or a residual effect of this incident, but it was only a few weeks later, in early December 1940, that the Dominions secretary was summoned to Chequers and informed that it was now proposed to move him. Various diaries speak of his name being put forward as ambassador in Washington or even viceroy of India. He was actually asked to become the secretary of state for India and take his hereditary seat in the House of Lords where he could then also answer FO questions. This provoked a long and emotional response:
As you know I was in the first doubtful about it, and the more I think, the more reluctant I feel, from many points of view. For one thing I am quite certain the Dominions themselves would greatly resent such frequent changes in the DO. They have already had three secretaries of state in little more than a year. If now they are asked to accept a fourth, they will draw the conclusion that they are regarded as of no account, and that the Office is treated merely as a receptacle for odd men out. They are exceedingly sensitive and the effect on them, especially at this moment when they are making so great an effort, might only too probably be deplorable.25
Adding to tensions was the growing anger within the DO over the question of information. During the summer Caldecote had presented the War Cabinet with a paper asking that the fullest possible account of wartime developments be given to the Dominions.26 Now Colonel William Bishop, the department's military liaison officer, attacked the continuing official reluctance to allow 'secret' information to be sent out, in a lengthy and often bitterly critical internal minute.27 This had been sparked by a letter from Churchill to the recently re-elected President Roosevelt outlining the war situation and the British position. Bishop thought it an outstanding review and wanted it sent to the Dominions but the proposal was rejected by the Service Departments who cited the prime minister's directive.28 The military officer believed that the time had come when Churchill needed to be tackled directly on his policy and Cranborne agreed, confiding to his deputy his fear that the country's leader had decided on a policy of communicating 'as little information' as he could get away with and even then 'only in reply to specific requests'.29 On one occasion it had even been suggested that a proposed telegram to his Dominion counterparts outlining the real figures for captured German U-boats should be delayed, it being better 'to let sleeping statistics lie'.30 He was not alone with his concerns, during the preceding month the Dominions secretary had received a number of similar complaints from Whitehall colleagues. He therefore wrote to Churchill just two days before Christmas reminding him that sharing information with the other Dominion leaders helped gain their confidence and ensured their practical cooperation.31 The oft-quoted