Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [43]
Churchill was clearly angered by events, even telling Bruce that the DO was ineffectual, although he did not refer to Cranborne by name.33 The Dominions secretary was, however, the obvious target as was clear from him being told not to attend the Tuesday meetings of the War Cabinet, the point being emphasized to him that these were reserved for those within government who made policy. He was not one of these people and his presence was therefore deemed to be surplus to requirements.34 Bobbety could do little but accept the new arrangements despite the obvious restrictions it would place on his ability to discuss future war strategy with the alliance members. He did, however, try to offer some further explanation to Churchill as to why he had protested. The Dominions were not complaining about the lack of prior consultation about the Dakar operation—although they were privately angry—it was the fact that they had not even been informed that it was taking place and had to learn this from the Press that was the cause of their concern. They were also not claiming 'any right to supervise the work of the War Cabinet'; they just wanted to feel that they were in the full confidence of the British leadership. Few within the DO believed the prime minister would change his mind and although he soon seemed a little more receptive to requests from the department, it was nonetheless clear that the Dominions secretary was out in the cold.35
This was the position when, in January 1941 Menzies set out on a journey to London to carry out a 'chancy undertaking' for which he had been long planning.36 The month before, Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour party but also Churchill's deputy in the wartime national unity government, had told the House of Commons no Dominions' representative would be joining the War Cabinet but this did not deter the Australian.37 The continuing difficulties he faced at home, his own political ambitions, a genuine sense of personal unease over the nature of the relationship Australia enjoyed with Britain and more general fears among his countrymen about future security in both the Mediterranean and Pacific regions all led him to make his decision to travel. Although he had assured his parliamentary colleagues that his absence would be brief, his decision to travel via Singapore and the Middle East to examine the strategic position at each of these key Imperial bastions meant that it would be nearly four months before he returned home. Menzies arrived in London in late February and was welcomed by a sympathetic press campaign, support he continued to enjoy throughout his stay.38 Within days he had a meeting with Churchill, the first between the two men, although the visit to Chequers did not augur well for the future. The Australian politician found his host a 'tempestuous creature' whose attire and general demeanour apparently shocked him, the haranguing of the 'holy terror' eventually sending him to bed a tired man.39 Nonetheless he chose to report back to Canberra in overwhelmingly positive tones, his host's qualities being 'much greater than we thought'. Menzies had also quickly formed the view that there was no doubt that Australia was 'Dominion Number One'.40 Throughout the next two months he experienced events in Britain first-hand, attending War Cabinet meetings whenever possible and generally trying to place himself at the heart of the policy- and decision-making processes. By the time of his final meeting with Churchill, the night prior to his return to Australia, he was convinced that all was not well at the heart of the Empire.
His Damascene moment was yet to come; in the meantime there was war business to consider. As has been seen, Australian and New Zealand troops had become central