Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [44]
As it became clear that British Commonwealth forces were poised to suffer a tragic defeat on the Peloponnesian peninsula, so Menzies' attitude towards the Empire's leader changed. Despite his later description of him as a 'great warrior-statesman [and] an unrivalled benefactor to posterity', privately he was now more scathing about 'the greatest asset and greatest danger' the Empire faced.43 There were others who agreed and as Churchill sank deeper into a growing political storm, Menzies was to be found at the heart of the intrigues complicit in the conspirators' meetings and discussions. In the final hours of his stay, he made his plans clear to Lord Hankey who had been demoted by the prime minister in May 1940 and was now centrally embroiled in the campaign opposing him. It was argued that there was only one possible course of action to be followed; an Imperial War Cabinet had to be summoned after which one of the Dominion leaders would have to stay behind. Elibank had stood again in the House of Lords in early April 1941 to raise the matter, but his peers had still generally doubted whether such a move would actually improve the conduct of the war and they were also unsure about how it might operate.44 Menzies' cabal had the answers: there would be a similar role to that played by Smuts in the last war, 'not as a guest but as a full member' and the Australian clearly thought he was the man for the job.45 Having discussed this with Sir John Simon, another whose loyalties to Churchill were doubtful, Hankey urged his Australian accomplice to seek one final meeting with the British leader. This was arranged but he could get 'no change' out of his host and he departed for North America and the long trip home where political crisis awaited him.46
His departure did not, however, mean an end to the intrigues and, in Menzies' absence, the anti-Churchill campaign soon reached its climax. During the first week of May 1941 a confidence debate was called in the House of Commons but despite the best efforts of such senior figures as Lloyd George and Hore-Belisha, the vote was won handsomely by the prime minister.47 The following day, Cranborne felt it prudent to warn Churchill of the true nature behind Menzies recent visit, advising him that he should 'have the background, in case you have not already got it'. The simple answer that came back to the DO was 'I have got it'.48 This was something of a rare written communication between the two. In March Cranborne had sought approval to send to the Dominion governments an appreciation made by the British military authorities of the likely chances of invasion but Churchill still would not cooperate, arguing that such 'questionable stuff' was not needed to frighten the Dominions into doing their duty. Secret intelligence, despite the department's continuing reservations, was still not to be sent to the Dominion governments.49
It was at this stage that the British leader signalled a pronounced change in policy. He had been told by Mackenzie King that Menzies, who had just left Ottawa