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about the new government's calibre.35 Cranborne himself lamented, earlier in 1941, that these were 'men who were entirely isolationist in their view and thought of nothing but the protection of Australia'.36 Curtin, the former journalist and trade union organizer, who had been jailed briefly for anti-conscription activity during the First World War, had been quoted in the British press back in August 1939 as being entirely opposed to Australia's involvement in another European war.37 By the time he took power, he had been Australia's opposition leader for five years but he had never held any high office and only two of his ministers had had any previous government experience. Cross found him very watchful and a British military visitor to Canberra reported back to London earlier in 1941 that, as a parliamentarian, Curtin 'didn't have the brains of Menzies'.38 His earliest act as leader was to deal with yet another request from his British counterpart to postpone the final withdrawal from Tobruk.39 Churchill pointed to the coalition's need for all available resources to support the imminent Allied operations in North Africa but Curtin was adamant that his remaining forces should be brought together. The Labour Party appeared to have entered office with few new ideas, adopting broadly similar policies to those of its predecessors.

There was, however, a much more forceful stance about the British Empire's defensive commitments in the Far East. The regional strategy had been a long-standing subject for discussion between London and the Antipodean Dominions.40 Since 1923 successive Australian and New Zealand governments had been reassured by their London-based counterparts that the stationing of a Royal Navy fleet at the Singapore Naval Base and the safeguard of that facility ranked only second to the defence of the British Isles themselves.41 But this guarantee had always carried with it a huge caveat, first revealed at the 1911 Imperial Conference when the Admiralty had complained about the Dominions' inability 'to comprehend the true principles of naval policy' and reiterated that the situation in the Pacific would always be 'absolutely regulated by events in the North Sea'.42 By April 1939 increased European tensions meant a variety of previously unanticipated questions now had to be considered. One result of this was that at the Pacific Defence Conference, held in Wellington, only qualified assurances were offered to the Dominions that a fleet would still be sent and the British delegation's assurances of continuing military support were clearly greeted with some suspicion. But there was no panic, at least not at this stage. The New Zealand government publicly 'remained cool-headed', noting that the decision represented a 'departure' from the previously given assurances yet asking merely that a review of Far East strategy be undertaken.43 The following month, in May 1939, the CID privately accepted that the 'Singapore Strategy' was no longer viable. A few weeks later a similar conclusion was reached amongst the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee but nothing was said to the Dominions themselves; indeed as far as they were concerned the strategy still held true.44

The decision of the Italian and Japanese governments to remain as bystanders in September 1939 meant that the Royal Navy could, in the short term at least, be deployed mainly in home and Mediterranean waters.45 As has been seen, this also allowed the British government to offer renewed guarantees to the Dominion delegates who visited London two months later that the Far East remained higher on the list of strategic priorities than the Mediterranean. Churchill did this despite the private acceptances that had been reached previously. The position changed with France's rapid collapse, the subsequent entry of Italy into the war and the increasing deterioration of relations with Japan. As it had long feared it would have to do, the DO now found itself having to tell the Dominion leaders that it was most unlikely a fleet could be spared for the Far East.46 Bruce complained