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Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [54]

By Root 972 0
bitterly on hearing the news so much so General Sir Hastings Ismay felt obliged to remind him that nobody had foreseen France's collapse, a disaster which removed both her fleet and her naval bases from previous strategic calculations.47 Such interpretations of pre-war British strategic planning were commonplace. Back in 1923 Churchill had argued that to not defend the Pacific Dominions with a British Fleet would be 'an act of desertion, of abrogation of duty and of ingratitude both cruel and fatal'.48 But emotive words dimmed with time; in March 1939 he had stressed to Chamberlain that 'on no account must anything which threatens in the Far East divert us from the prime objective'.49 By the year's end, when he produced his ambiguous memorandum on Australian Naval Defence, he was even more convinced that while fighting Nazi Germany it would not be possible to make commitments in the Far East.50 Official policy emanating from London in the months that followed seemed intent on saying as little as possible and when some form of reply was unavoidable it was given only in the vaguest terms.51

The worsening situation in the Far East was undoubtedly Curtin's primary cause for concern.52 Both he and his government colleagues believed that their soon-to-arrive representative in London would help keep them much better informed of developments. Page had set out with Fadden still in charge, travelling via the Dutch East Indies on to Singapore where he attended a conference at which defence measures for the Far East region were the main subject of discussion. Here he reviewed the significant Australian contribution to the island's defence. An exhaustive review of Singapore's defence capabilities had been concluded by Menzies in October 1940, following which it had been agreed to send Australian troops to the island. This took the form initially of a single brigade from the 8th Division sent with the caveat that it was to be relieved by Indian troops, allowing it to join its parent in the North African theatre. Under the command of General Gordon Bennett, this force had in fact remained and been expanded.53 Despite the change of government Curtin asked Page to continue and the Australian eventually reached Britain by way of the Philippines, the United States and Canada. This choice of route meant that he would not attend his first War Cabinet meeting until the last week of October. In the meantime he looked to Richard Casey, now Australian minister in Washington, to advise him of the American assessment of the situation. Since his arrival in 1940 to take charge of his country's first foreign diplomatic post Casey had proven a great success in establishing excellent contacts in Washington and these told him that the State Department believed there to be 'very little chance' that the Japanese would attack in the near future.54

As Page continued his long journey Mackenzie King cabled the British leader to reassure him. He had entertained the Australian in Ottawa and believed his guest only to be interested in the situation in the Far East with 'no thoughts of urging any kind of an Imperial War Cabinet or representation of Australia in the War Cabinet'.55 This was helpful information as fears remained in London that problems lay ahead. Page's selection was seen by one observer as 'an unfortunate choice' for, despite his being an elder statesman with considerable domestic political experience, he had 'little knowledge of defence or foreign affairs, no experience in diplomacy—he was a doctor by profession [who] owned a cattle station and was Minister of Commerce when appointed—and lacked the strength of character required to stand up to Churchill'. He was held to be 'genial' but at the same time 'fussy and rather stupid', not perhaps the best qualities for the job ahead.56 Others who had met him in Australia were more complimentary in their depiction of a 'straight, kindly country gentleman' although even these noted that he was 'a little inclined to stress the obvious at some length and without any pause for interruption'.57 In official

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