Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [67]
Some 75,000 copies of the first run were rapidly sold, the readers being urged to 'pay attention' to the rich tapestry of ideas and examples he employed to support his premise that the British Empire might not be entirely perfect but it remained a progressive force in world affairs, and the two sides needed to cooperate much more in the future. Nonetheless, as he wrote privately to a friend at about the same time as his book was finished: 'There are of course some features of American life which are, in my view, a menace. There is crudity in American big business as well as in some methods of American thought and discussion. In this crudity there are elements of brutality, vulgarity and naïveté'.73 It would be features such as these that would present the greatest of challenges to the cohesion of the Anglo-Dominion alliance as it entered its next crucial wartime phase.
Rupture?
The United States' entry into the war had been greeted by Churchill as the salvation of the Empire and he departed at once to visit his new coalition partner, undoubtedly primus inter pares. In his absence from London, and just a day after fighting had begun in the Pacific, Page had written to Canberra setting out the many deficiencies that he saw in the relationship with Britain.1 To rectify them he wanted to find a method that would allow Australian influence to be exerted as policy was being decided. This did not mean the creation of an Imperial War Cabinet but, instead, regular visits by special representatives who would stay for two or three months, attend the War Cabinet and support the high commissioner. In short they would 'come for a special job, get it done and get away'. Page also had strong opinions about the position of secretary of state for Dominion affairs. This should be one of Britain's most senior politicians, indeed, were it not for the fact that he already had so much to do, the prime minister would be the most obvious direct link with the Dominions. The clear inference, of course, was that Cranborne was not up to the job and should be replaced. Brooke-Popham, one of the many official British visitors to Australia during the latter half of 1941, had warned Whitehall of the growing need to make his hosts 'feel that we in England look upon them as definitely part of one Empire'.2 It was implied, somewhat prophetically, that were this not to happen there would be a risk of them 'slipping out'. This was now the danger as the Australian government insisted that better use be made of Page who, having heard that the Prince of Wales and Repulse had been sunk, had begun his own efforts to broaden his role.3 The authorities in Canberra were told the following year, by another Australian visitor, that all Page achieved during this period was to create 'a deplorable impression' and 'exerted little influence' in terms of wartime strategy. Nonetheless guarantees were secured that troops and planes would be diverted from the Middle East as well as an agreement that he would be given access to all of the facilities Curtin had requested.4
With mounting press comment in London about how Australia was reacting to the expanding war, there was again unease within Whitehall about the tone of some of Canberra's telegrams.5 Churchill was focused on his Washington meetings, but he was advised that recent messages were 'both critical and querulous' and contained 'demands and allegations made not on the basis of ascertained facts but on unspecified information and prior assumptions'.6 The atmosphere in London had grown extremely tense as 'the old gang' of Chamberlain supporters began to sense the prime minister was becoming