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By Root 941 0

politically vulnerable.7 As his deputy warned him, and as Cranborne and the DO had also long asked, calls for closer cooperation with Australia and the rest of the Dominions could no longer sensibly be resisted.8 On Boxing Day 1941, Australia's leader told Roosevelt and Churchill that the authorities in Canberra would be happy to accept an American commander in the Pacific. The following day, in a special 'New Year' article contributed to a leading Melbourne newspaper, Curtin went even further, writing that 'Australia looks to America, free of pangs as to our traditional links and kinship with the United Kingdom'.9 This was not the first time an Australian leader had referred to the Dominions' right to look beyond London for foreign policy guidance; Menzies had stated back in April 1939 that, where the Pacific was concerned, his government needed its own diplomatic contacts.10 The following year he had reiterated this view when asking Roosevelt to intervene directly in the Pacific and secure a peaceful resolution with Japan.11 The DO had ensured that these appeals received little media attention back in Britain but Curtin's new statement could not be so easily handled.12

To one contemporary commentator, the dissolution of the British Commonwealth was at hand.13 Cranborne's immediate advice following this latest development remained the same as it had always been, the Dominions would have to be given a weightier political role.14 The question of an Empire War Cabinet had again been raised in the House of Commons shortly after the Japanese attack in the Far East but the government had gone no further in response other than to say that this remained 'under constant consideration'. Having instructed Attlee to inform the War Cabinet of just how 'deeply shocked' Curtin's 'insulting speech' had left him, Churchill was not, however, in any mood for compromise. Travelling with Churchill, Sir Ian Jacob noted that although his companion had never really understood Far Eastern problems, throughout the war the Australian government had taken 'a narrow, selfish and at times craven view of events', in stark contrast to New Zealand.15 Much of his displeasure may well have been down to the fact that Curtin's decision to make his views known publicly had generated considerable press interest in Britain, exactly what the DO had been trying to avoid.16 The arrival of a report from Cross did little to improve the situation, the British high commissioner was downbeat about the Australian war effort handicapped as it was by a 'lack of political leadership, a shoddy and irresponsible press and a number of trade union leaders reaping a dirty harvest'. Machtig thought it all 'a desperate picture'; Cranborne noted that the report had been delayed as it had come by sea and hoped that Japan's entry into the war during the interim might have had some positive effect.17 Nevertheless, the situation in Canberra clearly left him dejected, the government there could do little other than 'squabble, grumble and blame others, in particular us'. And his mood was made all the worse, as he told Churchill, by the British public's obvious shock at the recent Australian outburst. Indeed so negative had the reaction been that he had asked the Ministry of Information to discourage further press speculation.18

On the final day of 1941, Sir Earle Page talked once more with Cranborne. During the preceding three weeks his focus had remained improving Australia's position and he had enjoyed some success. Discussions with senior British political figures had yielded promises that all FO papers, irrespective of their subject matter, would be made available for him to inspect. Perhaps emboldened by this agreement, the Australian now shared his thoughts on how the Anglo-Dominion alliance should operate in future, specifically in the first instance Britain's relationship with his own country.19 It was his view that ministers from the Dominions should join the Defence Committee, the Ministry of Supply and a man 'of considerable standing' should be embedded within the FO where