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By Root 934 0

they could view papers and put forward opinions. Cranborne was also left in little doubt, not for the first time by a visiting Australian, that he was much too junior and was not a suitable person to be the secretary of state. Page's considered opinion was that somebody who was a member of both the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee should fill the position, which in future would have to be 'regarded as second only to the Prime Minister'. In the face of such frank advice Cranborne remained affable, seeing 'some force' in the arguments.20 He even circulated recommendations to the FO that, as a first step, his Whitehall colleagues should appoint a representative, with the rank of under-secretary, to act as a liaison with the DO. This would be helpful not just for the Dominions but, as he rather caustically pointed out, it would also aid a department which was still often not consulted at the earliest stages.

The Dominions secretary also correctly assumed that Page would waste little time in sending his revised proposals to Canberra. The idea that Bruce should be made the permanent accredited representative was rejected by Curtin but London was informed that an Australian politician would be sent and it was expected that he would have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet.21 This prompted Cranborne to write directly to Eden to suggest, yet again, that the existing system needed to be changed.22 Within the FO the reaction was decidedly unenthusiastic, Victor Cavendish Bentinck being most notable for the patronising tone in which he referred to the alliance partners; Cranborne's proposals would achieve little other than 'please the Dominions'.23 This senior official also appeared worried that there was insufficient knowledge of 'the mentality' of the Dominion governments to allow the liaison role to function properly. One of his colleagues did, however, recognize that a clear problem existed in so much as the DO was a 'channel for the discussion of policy, the finished article', but 'does not take much hand in the processing of the raw material, in the formulation of policy'.24 As Cranborne had passionately argued now for some months, the proposed solution was to find a method to allow the Dominion leaders to put forward amendments at a much earlier stage. It was also understood that the issue had now assumed 'big proportions' and, hence, would need to be discussed with Churchill on his return from the United States.

The prime minister was, however, already fully occupied at this stage dealing with another Australian complaint. During his Washington discussions he had agreed with Roosevelt's proposal that General Wavell be appointed supreme commander of the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) command area.25 The authorities in Canberra seemed relatively content with this until they learned that the defence of Australia and Papua New Guinea was not to be included. Curtin and his colleagues were left angered by what was felt to be the ignoring of the Dominion's security. This was not repeated across the Tasman, however, where the reaction of the public to the worsening local situation was noted by the high commissioner as having been 'remarkably calm'.26 As Batterbee told the DO, with some obvious sense of satisfaction, the greater distance of New Zealand from the Japanese menace could account for some of the difference. There was also 'a clear conscience', the knowledge that the authorities in Wellington had a war record beyond reproach which left no requirement 'to cover up their shortcomings by blaming other people'. From Canberra there came more angry telegrams, the net outcome being Curtin insisting that the Dominion be included within the new command area. Churchill offered soothing words about how he recognized Australia's interests but privately he remained dismissive of any criticism of his handling of the relationship with the authorities in Canberra. While recuperating from a mild stroke in Florida, his mood had been downright belligerent, highly critical of people of 'bad stock'.27 He would not agree to