Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [70]
After his three-week absence, Churchill returned to Britain to more bad news. The garrison at Hong Kong had already long since surrendered. Successive chiefs of staff appreciations had outlined the inevitably of its loss in the event of any determined Japanese assault. Churchill had himself written to Ismay in January 1941 that there was 'not the slightest chance' that it could be held or even relieved—yet when the expected collapse came he still expressed surprise:
The worst thing that has happened is the collapse of the resistance of Hong Kong; although one knew it was a forlorn outpost, we expected that they would hold out on the fortified island for a good many weeks, possibly for several months, but now they seem on the verge of surrender after only a fortnight's struggle.29
While in Washington he had remained confident that Singapore would fare much better and be able to hold off a Japanese attack for as long as two months, but the information he received now suggested otherwise. He informed Curtin that, in his opinion, the loss of Malaya had been inevitable in light of the general war situation, but urged his counterpart not to become 'dismayed or get into recrimination', nor to doubt 'his loyalty to [both] Australia and New Zealand'.30 To his Cabinet he rejected the need for greater cooperation, arguing that it would not be possible until such time as the Australians had put to one side 'their Party feud and set up a National Government' and the sincerity of the prime minister's sensitivity towards his fellow Dominion leader was not difficult to spot.31 An obvious example was the Far Eastern Council which it had been agreed to establish, to 'focus and formulate views' in London before passing them on to Roosevelt. Canberra had not been informed of this decision in advance and heard two days after the authorities in Wellington. When official confirmation arrived it was not surprising therefore that this was critically received. Indeed the Advisory War Council quickly declared its unanimous disagreement with the proposal and instead requested that a Pacific Council be established in Washington.32
Cranborne's problems in Canberra were not restricted to the criticism coming from the Australian government. In a long and often venomous telegram sent to London, Cross had launched a sustained attack on the Australian leadership. Relations in the past had always been based on 'the assumption that the Commonwealth government shared the spirit of Imperial Partnership', but in recent weeks it had become obvious to him that this was no longer forthcoming. The former British minister believed that there was clear evidence showing 'abuse of the United Kingdom authorities'. He therefore urged the DO to help him gain better access to the Australian War Cabinet and to the messages it was sending to London as 'the time [had] come to collect all our weapons and to fight for British prestige'. The greatest alarm was reserved, however, for his final recommendation, that economic pressure be applied with a British refusal to undertake 'negotiations of a commercial or financial character'. The Dominions secretary was aghast, so much so that Cross was warned that to pursue such a line would not bring Australia closer but instead 'give further stimulus to their tendency to look to the United States'. Although he was sympathetic to his high commissioner's situation, Cranborne had already acknowledged privately that he had 'taken to lecturing Australian Ministers as if they were small and rather dirty boys'.33 Shortly after his arrival in Australia, Cross had written back to London that he was 'puzzled' by what he had found. In the intervening period he had endured a difficult