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Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [83]

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from being amazed that an American politician should say such a thing, it seemed clear that there was a section within the United States 'who seem to think that we should liquidate the Empire—God forbid we ever do!' Across the Tasman Antipodean hostility in response to similar American sentiments had extended beyond strong language. The British high commissioner in Canberra had reported in December 1942 that riots had broken out in Brisbane and the behaviour of even quite senior US officers, particularly in the US Air Force, had become a cause for real concern. The Australian military was clearly unhappy with its American counterparts, in part because of a failure to fulfil promises of material support but also because of the often disparaging attitude displayed by the visiting forces to their new allies.36 Orders had apparently been issued by Generals Eisenhower and Clark that any member of the US forces in North Africa heard making derogatory remarks about Britain or British forces were to be sent home.37 This did not apparently extend, however, to the South Pacific.

From his vantage part at the heart of the British Embassy in Washington it was Gerald Campbell who had precipitated much of the debate about American thinking on the Empire with the reports he sent back to the FO. Previously Britain's other representative in Ottawa, after Mackenzie King had fallen out with him, he had been moved to become senior British Minister to Washington where he had been warmly welcomed, in at least some circles.38 Typical of his warnings to London was that written in August 1942 discussing Australia's position. In a lunch with Roosevelt his host had told him that the Australians 'had been rather a nuisance' in their efforts to gravitate closer towards him. Campbell apparently enjoyed taking the opportunity to tell the president that the Australian attitude made little sense: 'I have often noticed that Americans think the Australians like them, and therefore their country, much better than us and our country, and that they only have to beckon for them to come: and I have also noticed that when Australians, who rather play up to this idea initially, are beckoned, they are furious.' The same conclusion was held among the FO's mandarins, 'a distant flirtation is one thing but [the Australians and Canadians] would both recoil violently from embraces which would, in their view, shortly be of the possessive kind'.39

The 'Open Letter to the People of England', published by Life magazine in October 1942 and running to some 1,700 words, is perhaps the most visible wartime example of American disdain for British imperialism. It famously pronounced: 'One thing we are sure we are not fighting for is to hold the British Empire together. We don't like to put the matter so bluntly, but we don't want you to have any illusions. If your strategists are planning a war to hold the British Empire together they will sooner or later find themselves strategizing alone.'40 There was also the worldwide tour made by Wendell Wilkie, the defeated 1940 Republican presidential candidate, the focus of which was the condemnation of colonialism at every opportunity, apparently with Roosevelt's tacit approval. Amery thought his strategy to be a 'mischievous and silly effusion', telling Cranborne that he had become angry 'about our worthy allies, who are no doubt good at mechanical production, but slightly ignorant in other domains'. His suggestion was that the secretary of state for colonies should broadcast to America 'saying that Wendell Wilkie is an ignorant and mischievous ass'. Bobbety agreed that there could indeed be more productive use made of propaganda and assured his colleague that he favoured 'a sturdier attitude' than had been the case previously promising 'we will not stand before our Allies in a white sheet'.41 The Wilkie tour certainly had an impact, spectacularly backfiring as Stalin, whilst pleased to see his two key allies bickering, used the visit to Moscow as an opportunity to chastise Roosevelt and Churchill. As for the principal target, the British

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