Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [84]
The reaction to all of this American interventionism was generally hostile, even amongst the Dominions and their representatives overseas. The London-based high commissioners were notably critical about the degree to which there was an American sense of defeatism about the future of the Empire. Attlee wrote to Churchill in June 1942 to warn him that they were growing restless and were 'considerably exercised in their minds as to the habit of prominent American, including members of the Administration, of talking as if the British Empire was in the process of dissolution'. He went on: 'It would be well for the Americans, whose knowledge of Dominion sentiment is not extensive, to be aware that the British Colonial Empire is not a kind of possession of the Old Country, but is part of a larger whole in which the Dominions are also interested.' There was also reference to the aggressive commercial activities of the Empire's main strategic ally, with the Dominion representatives also being disturbed by 'the economic imperialism of the American business interests which is quite active under the cloak of a benevolent and avuncular internationalism'.43 Smuts received his own lengthy assessment of the position as it was understood by his representative. The commonly held view in Whitehall, and one with which the South African high commissioner agreed, was that 'the average American is convinced that Great Britain rules the Empire (in which is included India and the Dominions) direct from Downing Street, derives large revenues in direct taxation from everywhere and that the Empire is peopled with subject races to whom the glorious freedom enjoyed by every American is unknown'.44 Massey returned home distinctly anti-American, at least in terms of his private outlook. His biographer speculates that this might have been as a result of American over-assertiveness in Newfoundland and Canada or over-glorification of the role that the American military had played in Europe.45 Or, more simply, it might have been as a result of having to deal with the American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy 'or the complacent self-satisfaction of visiting American movie stars and politicians'.46
From the war's earliest stages there had been many besides Churchill and Cranborne who had recognized that maintaining Imperial unity in the post-war world was an absolute prerequisite if Britain was to have any hope of keeping a powerful voice. Perhaps the three most celebrated contributions to the debate came not from parliamentarians at Westminster. The first was a speech given by John Curtin who, speaking in Adelaide in mid-August 1943, had proposed the creation of a supreme body to govern the entire post-war Empire. He had apparently re-embraced the 'Imperial Idea', conveniently forgetting his earlier emotive 'looks to America' statement. The United States had subsequently mishandled the war, and Curtin had become 'no lover of the Yankees'.47 No doubt buoyed on by the positive reaction he received, the Australian expanded upon his proposals during the following months. An Empire Council could be a permanent body with a permanent supporting secretariat. Its regular meetings could be held in the various Dominion capitals and so on. It was an apparently far-reaching argument, although of course, as commentators in Canberra were quick to point out a similar series of proposals had been first put forward during the 1911 Imperial Conference and resoundingly rejected.48 Various Australian speakers made the journey to the Royal Empire Society in London where they repeated a broadly similar message—Australia was determined to assist in maintaining the British Empire.49 In the DO Paul Emrys-Evans was particularly pleased at the visit by a Parliamentary Delegation from Canberra. He thought they returned home impressed by