FDR - Jean Edward Smith [487]
75. Heinrichs, Threshold of War 200. Also see Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War 865–867; Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom 155.
76. The text of the Japanese proposal (“Plan B”) is reprinted in Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor 309. Also see Foreign Relations of the United States, 2 Japan 755–756.
77. Togo to Nomura, November 4, 1941, 12 Pearl Harbor Attack 92–93. Also see Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War 856.
78. In his Memoirs Hull wrote that acceptance of the Japanese offer would have meant “condonement by the United States of Japan’s past aggressions … betrayal of China and Russia, and acceptance of the role of silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony over the western Pacific and eastern Asia … [The proposals] were of so preposterous a character that no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting them.” 2 Memoirs 1069–1070.
For a skeptical assessment of Hull’s ex post facto judgment, see Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War 880. The Japanese offer was only an interim, stopgap arrangement to provide further time to negotiate a long-term settlement.
79. 14 Pearl Harbor Attack 1109. FDR’s note is also reprinted in Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War 872, and Freidel, Rendezvous with Destiny 398. Langer and Gleason date the note earlier than do others.
80. Foreign Relations of the United States, 2 Japan 739 ff.
81. Ickes, 3 Secret Diary 649–650.
82. Gerow to Hull, November 21, 1941, 14 Pearl Harbor Attack 1103–1107.
83. Togo to Nomura, November 22, 1941, 12 Pearl Harbor Attack 163–165.
84. The classic revisionist argument is Charles A. Beard’s President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, especially 517–569 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948). Also see Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway, Breaking the Secrets 198–207 (New York: William Morrow, 1985); William Henry Chamberlain, America’s Second Crusade 167–168 (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950).
85. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 307–308; Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy 572–573; Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept 369; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the United States 737 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964); Freidel, Rendezvous with Destiny 400; Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History 177–193 (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
86. For Hull’s account, see Hull, 2 Memoirs 1081–1082 and the memorandum he dictated pertaining thereto at 14 Pearl Harbor Attack 1176–1177. Colonel Stimson’s account is in his diary entry of November 26, 1941. The most sustained critique of the accounts provided by Hull and Stimson is not in the works of radical and revisionist historians but in Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War 885 ff.—a work sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.
87. Ibid. 893.
88. WSC to FDR, November 26, 1941, 1 Churchill & Roosevelt 277–278.
89. Ickes, 3 Secret Diary 655. For Morgenthau’s opposition to negotiating with Japan, see Blum, 2 Morgenthau Diaries 389–391.
90. On November 24, 1941, Admiral Stark warned Navy commanders in the Pacific, “There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of [Japanese] government and movement of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.… Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.” Stark to CinC Asiatic Fleet and CinC Pacific Fleet, November 24, 1941, 14 Pearl Harbor Attack 1405.
91. Stimson diary (MS), November 25, 1941.
92. Ibid.
93. The text of Hull’s “Ten Point Offer” is in Foreign Relations of the United States, 2 Japan 766–770. Also see Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War 896–897.
94. Freidel, Rendezvous with Destiny 400.
95. Stimson diary