God's Fury, England's Fire_ A New History of the English Civil Wars - Michael J. Braddick [394]
73. For the dispute see Heather Falvey, ‘Crown Policy and Local Economic Context in the Berkhamsted Common Enclosure Dispute, 1618–42’, Rural History, 12 (2001), 123–58. For Edlyn’s contribution see TNA, E. 179/248/19; Andrew Hopper, ‘The Wortley Park Poachers and the Outbreak of the English Civil War’ (forthcoming).
74. See above, pp. 184–5. For a sensitive discussion of the issues see John Walter, ‘The English People and the English Revolution Revisited’, History Workshop Journal, 61 (2006), 171–182. For the ability of merchant networks to take advantage of the times see Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653 (Cambridge, 1993), esp. pt 3. This is my gloss on his argument; he emphasizes the potential of this analysis to support a broader interpretation of the conflict as grounded in class interests.
75. Walter, Understanding Popular Violence: John Morrill and John Walter, ‘Order and Disorder in the English Revolution’, in Fletcher and Stevenson (ed.), Order and Disorder, pp. 137–65; Fletcher, Outbreak, ch. 12. Manning put this fear of disorder at the heart of royalism: English People, chs. 3, 7, 8. See also Lady Sydenham above, pp. 227–8. For an overview of theories of allegiance see Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, ch. 1.
76. Ann Hughes, The Causes of the English Civil War, 2nd edn (Basingstoke, 1998), p. 168.
8. Armed Negotiation
1. Details of this and all military encounters are hard to agree and are much written about. For a general account of the difficulties see Malcolm Wanklyn, Decisive Battles of the English Civil War: Myth and Reality (Barnsley, 2006), chs. 1–2. Here and elsewhere I have relied upon Peter Young and Richard Holmes, The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651 (Ware, 2000 edn), pp. 69–71; Malcolm Wanklyn and Frank Jones, A Military History of the English Civil War, 1642–1646: Strategy and Tactics (Harlow, 2005), pp. 44–5. Austin Woolrych’s fine political narrative Britain in Revolution 1625–1660 (Oxford, 2002) is also informative about military matters: Woolrych wrote a number of important military histories. For the battle and subsequent desecration of the cathedral see Gardiner, I, pp. 30, 66.
2. Wanklyn and Jones, Military History, pp. 46–8; Young and Holmes, English Civil War, pp. 71–3. The King’s infantry complement at Edgehill was probably larger than at any point later in the war, but was not at all well armed: Ian Roy, ‘The Royalist Army in the First Civil War’, unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford (1963), pp. 50, 160–63.
3. M. C. Fissel, English Warfare, 1511–1642 (London, 2001), offers a very good overview.
4. For the role of Scottish ‘soldiers of fortune’ see Mark Stoyle, Soldiers and Strangers: An Ethnic History of the English Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 2005), esp. pp. 77–9: being in pay is not always the same as being a mercenary in the more general sense, of course: see his index entry for ‘mercenary’ for the conflation.
5. David Trim, ‘Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps, 1562–1642’, History Compass, 4/6 (2006), 1024–48, at pp. 1024–5.
6. Barbara Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England’s Military Education before 1642’, PP, 147 (1995), 65–100. For the muster masters See also Lindsey O. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638 (London, 1967), esp. pp. 224–7, 287–91; Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven, Conn., 1992), pp. 28–30, 487–500.
7. Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days’. For the importance of the Trained Bands, and their stores of arms, see above, p. 223.
8. For this and the following two paragraphs I have relied on Young and Holmes, English Civil War, pp. 73–81, updated in the light of the account in Wanklyn and Jones, Military History, pp. 50–55. For a detailed account of the sources and the ambiguities of any narrative