In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [45]
Nonetheless, in the wake of the Hariri attack, rumors circulated that the opposition was trying to form a central platform for the first time. So we chased down the opposition’s leadership to get their story as part of Syria Today’s coverage of the conference. What we found, in a Syrian context, was amazing and changed my mind about Syria’s domestic opposition.
In the days following Hariri’s murder, two unnamed members of the Committee for the Revival of Civil Society flew to Morocco to meet Muslim Brotherhood chief Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni to discuss basic principles on which a united opposition front could be formed. The two returned to Syria with agreement on four broad points: democracy, nonviolence, a unified opposition structure, and a commitment to democratic change. Somewhat surprisingly, the two were empowered to negotiate with Syrian parties on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood to forge an accord. Having direct contact with the Muslim Brotherhood was a risky endeavor for any Syrian, as Law 49 of 1980 made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death. The drafting of what would eventually become known as the Damascus Declaration began. Following Assad’s promise that the Baath Party conference “will be a leap for development in this country,” rumors then circulated that members of the Muslim Brotherhood would be allowed to return to Syria without arrest.
The political base of the declaration started to take shape. Civil-society activists met in the offices of Samir Nashar, leader of the nascent Free National Party and a wealthy Aleppo trader, whose discussion forum was shut down in October 2002 in one of the state’s final crackdowns on the Damascus Spring—the period of about two years after Assad’s inaugural speech when Syrians met freely and often to discuss the country’s problems.
“We met on April 4, 2005, and decided it was time to open dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood,” Nashar told me in an interview in March 2006. “We needed to bring the exiled and domestic opposition together.” On April 17, Hassan Abdel-Azim, spokesperson for the opposition’s National Democratic Rally—a grouping of five leftist pan-Arab parties—announced that it was ready to talk with the Muslim Brotherhood as well.
Things soon got complicated, however.
“Some of the opposition was afraid to include the Muslim Brotherhood, because they thought it would cause big problems with the authorities,” Nashar said. “They didn’t know how the regime would react.”
It wasn’t long before they found out. On May 24, eight members of the Atassi discussion forum—the only group that remained open after the Damascus Spring crackdown—were arrested when civil-society activist Ali al-Abdullah read aloud a statement from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Bayanouni. This followed the possibly unrelated disappearance and murder of Kurdish Sheikh Muhammad Mashouk al-Khaznawi, whose tortured body was found on May 11. Nashar claims Khaznawi had an “open dialogue” with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian state denied any culpability in the murder, which has since been attributed to a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist who had earlier branded Khaznawi an apostate. Human rights activists announced on Arab satellite TV that Brotherhood members would be arrested if they returned.
Because of fear of state persecution—or hope that Article 8 of the Syrian constitution, which says that the Baath Party must lead the state and society, would be repealed at the party’s conference the following month and a new “parties law” would be introduced that would allow Syria’s opposition to officially participate in political life—Abdel-Azim decided not to rush things.
“Our idea was to establish a narrow coalition that could be expanded,