In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [46]
On visits to Beirut, I was always bombarded with questions on “the situation in Syria.” I used to be able to answer this authoritatively, citing a specific development or law that had been passed and the implications. In the spring of 2005, however, I had to just throw up my hands and say, “I have no idea.”
No one did. The rumor mill in Damascus, always running at full speed, was out of control. Some people talked about tensions between the old guard and the president; others, tensions in the Assad family itself. As a rule, I always discounted such gossip, but one piece of news put me on edge. A friend with strong connections to the security services stopped by for a drink on my terrace. During the conversation, he paused, deep in thought. When I asked him what was wrong, he looked up and said, “You would never believe what happened to me this morning. Someone from [unnamed Syrian official’s] people visited me. The reason? To get my comment on a list of major political figures. It started out with the president’s name, and then one word comments or short statements describing their strengths and weaknesses. Next to the president’s name, the descriptions read, ‘weak, inept, unable to lead,’ things like that. Next was the president’s wife Asma, which read ‘arrogant, dreamer, etc.’ It just went on and on. It was like someone was carrying out a human resources evaluation at a company. When I realized someone was doing just that for Syria, and in such detail, I began to shake. I couldn’t believe that anyone in Syria could put such things into print. I was afraid to even touch it.”
Syria had always been an enigma, but hearing this story upset me. The way my friend told the story indicated that it had indeed happened. The fact that some kind of human resources evaluation of Syria’s leadership was going on indicated to me that Syria was ruled by an oligarchy. And the fact that it was coming from this official—who was supposed to be retired and out of power—was even more shocking. Who was included in this oligarchy remained unknown. It is easy to assume important figures such as President Assad or Vice President Khaddam were involved, but this left out powerful relatives, security chiefs, and associates.
When someone asked me how to describe the political situation in Syria, I simply called it “the blackness.” Using the term “fog” would have been out of the question, as fog tends to move or dissipate. The blackness just stayed in place, but it was not without its own dynamics. Rumors of gunfights between rival security services and stories of the house arrest of Vice President Khaddam were indications of the struggle going on inside this black cloud. It was as if suddenly a giant black hand had reached out of the morass and swooped back in, doubtlessly grabbing for some unknown rival obscured in the cloud.
In addition to the opposition’s being able to coordinate their activities, security restrictions were also relaxed. This included permitting everything from the establishment of factories, restaurants, shops, and medical practices to allowing embassy staff to visit their citizens in jail or make inquiries about missing nationals in Syria.
The prospects for reform were another matter. In May 2005, for example, Nibras al-Fadel, a special adviser to President Assad on financial affairs, resigned unexpectedly following an interview he gave with the newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, in which he outlined the judicial and market reforms necessary for the Syrian economy to avert economic crisis in the near future.12
Syrians close to the regime didn’t give up hope. One rumor said that the political system would be opened up to allow for independent political parties and that Law 49 of 1980, which made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death, would be repealed. Another said that the conference would conclude with a recommendation by the party that Article 8 of