Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [100]
In general, opportunity analysis is not engaged in often and is easily misunderstood when it is produced. However, in his October 25, 2005, National Intelligence Strategy, then-DNI John Negroponte (2005-2007) made opportunity analysis one of his strategic mission objectives.
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS. One critique of the intelligence community’s performance on Iraqi WMD was the alleged failure to examine alternative analytical lines. Even if true, it remains difficult in the case of Iraq to come up with analytically and intellectually sensible arguments that, in 2003. Saddam Hussein had come clean and had no WMD and was telling the truth when he made this case. Still, looking beyond the Iraq WMD case, the issue of alternative analysis is an important one. The 2004 intelligence law requires that the DNI create a process to ensure the effective use of alternative analysis.
The main driver is the concern that analysts can fasten on to one line of analysis, especially for issues that are examined and reexamined over the years, and then will not be open to other possible hypothesis or alternatives. Should this happen, the analyst will then not be alert for changes, discontinuities, or surprises, even if they are not threatening. One way to attempt to avoid this potential intellectual trap is to create alternative analyses or red cells.
For several reasons, the intelligence community has not always embraced the concept. First, concerns arise that the process can be political in nature or can lead to politicization. The Team A and Team B example from the cold war (see chap. 11) remains a warning in this regard. The alternative analysis group (Team B) was made up of individuals who were more hawkish about dealing with the Soviet Union. Thus, it was no surprise that they found the NIEs on Soviet strategic goals wanting. The existence of an alternative analysis, especially on controversial issues, can lead policy makers to shop for the intelligence they want or cherry-pick analysis, which also results in politicization. Second, only so many analysts are available to deal with any issue or have the requisite expertise on any issue. Therefore, a decision has to be made as to which analysts are assigned to the mainstream and which to the alternative group. Their levels of expertise should be roughly equal. For analysts who have been on the losing side of issues in the area in the past, the chance to participate in alternative analysis may be an irresistible opportunity to reopen old arguments or settle scores. Finally, one of the prerequisites for alternative analysis is that it provide a fresh look at an issue. Therefore, as soon as this type of capacity is institutionalized and made a regular part of the process, it loses the originality and vitality that were sought in the first place.
Alternative analysis consists of more than simply asking a contrafactual question. As in the case of Iraq WMD, the contrafactual question (make the case that Saddam is telling the truth and has no WMDs) would likely not have yielded a better analytical result. The analyst or the analytical manager has to be alert to the nature of the issue under consideration and the type of contrafactual question that will actually probe the generally held premise. It may be necessary to try several such questions before coming up with one that truly challenges the prevailing wisdom.
The 2004 intelligence law puts great emphasis on alternative analysis, competitive analysis, and red teaming, which are all variants on the same theme—an effort to avoid groupthink. The DNI is responsible for institutionalizing processes for these other types of analysis.
The intelligence community has long sought analytic tools, which means both programs and techniques