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Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [101]

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that will foster better analysis. The computer industry has advanced the intelligence community’s ability to collect, manipulate, and correlate data, all of which eases part of the analyst’s burden. But there have also been problems integrating the tools into the analytic process, in large part because of the intellectual disconnect between those responsible for designing the tools and the analysts. Programmers and analysts do not think along similar lines, and too many programs have been developed without regard to how analysts think or work. Also, too few of the tools have been tested by working analysts. The net result has often been a new program that sits unused on an analyst’s computer desk top because it is either overly complex or not complementary to the analyst’s working methods.

There are also a variety of analytic techniques available to analysts. Some of the more popular ones, in the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraq, are alternative competing hypotheses (ACH) and argument mapping, among others. ACH offers a simple way to ensure that multiple plausible explanations for the known intelligence are considered, as well as assessing which hypotheses are more likely by building a matrix to consider alternative scenarios. Argument mapping allows the analyst to diagram a given issue or case and break it into contentions, premises, rebuttals, and so on to get an improved sense of the true substance of the case. Some of these techniques have strong advocates both inside and beyond the intelligence community. But it is best to think about these like tools, no different than a homeowner’s toolbox. No tool is right for every job. They key is to be conversant with the tools and to know which one is right for which job.

ESTIMATES. The United States creates and uses analytical products called estimates (or assessments in Britain and Australia). These serve two major purposes: to see where a major issue or trend will go over the next several years and to present the considered view of the entire intelligence community, not just one agency. In the United States their communitywide origin is signified by the fact that the director of national intelligence signs completed estimates, just as DCIs did before.

Estimates are not predictions of the future but rather considered judgments as to the likely course of events regarding an issue of importance to the nation. Sometimes, more than one possible outcome may be included in a single estimate. The difference between estimate and prediction is crucial but often misunderstood, especially by policy makers. Prediction foretells the future—or attempts to. Estimates are more vague, assessing the relative likelihood of one or more outcomes. If an event or outcome were predictable—that is, capable of being foretold—one would not need intelligence agencies to estimate its likelihood. It is the uncertainty or unknowability that is key. As American baseball icon Yogi Berra said, “It is very difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.”

The bureaucratics of estimates are important to their outcome. In the United States, national intelligence officers are responsible for preparing estimates. They circulate the terms of reference (TOR) among colleagues and other agencies at the outset of an estimate. The TOR may be the subject of prolonged discussion and negotiation, as various agencies may believe that the basic questions or lines of analysis are not being framed properly. The drafting is not done by the NIOs but by someone from the NIO’s office, or the NIO may recruit a drafter from one of the intelligence agencies. Once drafted, the estimate is coordinated with other agencies, that is, the other agencies read it and give comments, not all of which are accepted, because they may be at variance with the drafter’s views. Numerous meetings are held to resolve disputes, but the meetings may end with two or more views on some aspects that cannot be reconciled. The DNI chairs a final meeting, a National Intelligence Board, which is attended by senior officials from a number of agencies.

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