Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [109]
• Work methods: The new cadre of analysts are more comfortable working in networks and working more collaboratively, both of which are positive attributes. They also are much more comfortable with information technology and working in a “softcopy” world. It is too soon to know, however, if they will be comfortable asserting themselves and their views when necessary or if they will default to lowest-common-denominator analyses as part of their collaborative instinct. It is also not clear how the new cadre of analysts will assess incoming intelligence. One of the charms of the Worldwide Web is that it is a democratic institution: Anyone is free to post any of their views on any subject. This is also, from an intelligence viewpoint, a problem, as intelligence must address the issue of validity of sources: Who are they? What is their basis for saying this? Are they knowledgeable and credible? Do they have motives for saying this? If one thinks of the Web as a giant bulletin board where anything can be posted and shared, the ability to rise above that in working on intelligence becomes more evident. The Web may be an interesting metaphor for collaboration, but it can be dangerous when assessing views and information.
• Retention: A key issue for intelligence agencies is retaining as many of these new analysts, or at least the good ones, as possible. Poor retention rates will only replicate the current demographic problems that led to this issue. Retention goes to the issues of career management, career progression, and education and training. These have not been areas to which managers have given much attention until recently, but they will underpin much of the other efforts at transformation.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: AN ASSESSMENT
Sherman Kent, an intellectual founder of the U.S. intelligence community and especially of its estimative process, once wrote that every intelligence analyst has three wishes: to know everything, to be believed, and to influence policy for the good (as the analyst understands it). Kent’s three wishes offer a yardstick by which to measure analysis. Clearly, an analyst can never know everything in a given field. If everything were known, the need for intelligence would not exist—nothing would be left to discover. But what Kent is getting at is the desire of the analyst to know as much as possible about a given issue before being asked to write about it. The amount of intelligence available varies from issue to issue and from time to time. Analysts must therefore be trained to develop some inner, deeper knowledge that enable them to read between the lines, to make educated guesses or intuitive choices when the intelligence is insufficient.
Kent’s second wish—to be believed—goes to the heart of the relationship between intelligence and policy. Policy makers pay no price for ignoring intelligence, barring highly infrequent strategic disasters such as Josef Stalin’s refusal to accept the signs of an imminent German attack in 1941. Intelligence officers see themselves as honest and objective messengers who add value to the process, who provide not just sources but also analysis. Their reward, at the end of the process, is to be listened to, which varies greatly from one policy maker to another.
Finally, and derived from his second wish, Kent notes that intelligence officers want to have a positive effect on policy, to help avert disaster and to help produce positive outcomes in the nation’s interests. But analysts want to be more than a Cassandra, constantly warning of doom and disaster. Their wish to have a positive