Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [123]
Assessing the nature and scope of the espionage threat to the United States may be more difficult in the post-cold war world than it had been before the demise of the Soviet Union, not only because the ideological conflict is over but because the sources and goals of penetrations mav have changed. A 2002 report prepared for Congress listed China, France, India, Israel, Japan, and Taiwan as being among the most active collectors. The most commonly targeted types of intelligence are U.S. military capabilities, U.S. foreign policy, technological expertise, and business plans. Government officials need not be the sole targets. For certain types of intelligence, government contractors may be key. Also, just as the United States relies on liaison relationships to enhance its HUMINT, so do foreign nations. In 2001, Ana Belen Montes, a DIA analyst, was arrested for spying for Cuba. U.S. officials assume that much of the intelligence that Montes provided over seventeen years was shared by Cuba with Russia and possibly other nations. Another 2002 report. Espionnge against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001, prepared by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center, noted changes in the demographics of U.S. citizens who spied against their country. Since the end of the cold war, spies have tended to be older, to have lower clearances, to be naturalized citizens instead of native-born, and to include more women. Thus, it would be naive to believe that the need for rigorous counterintelligence and counterespionage ceased with the end of the cold war.
KEY TERMS
big CI
compartmented
counterespionage
counterintelligence
counterintelligence poly
damage assessment
double agents
graymail
lifestyle poly
little CI
mole
national security letters (NSLs)
need to know
polygraph
responsibility to provide
sleeper agent
FURTHER READINGS
Reliable and comprehensible discussions of counterintelligence—apart from mere spy stories—are rare. What follows are among the most reliable sources.
Bearden, Milt, and James Risen. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House, 2003.
Benson, Robert Louis, and Michael Warner, eds. VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957. Washington, D.C.: NSA and CIA, 1996.
Doyle, Charles. “National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: A Glimpse of the Legal Background and Recent Amendments.” Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Report RS22406, March 21, 2006. (Available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22406.pdf.)
Godson, Roy S. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995.
Hitz, Frederick P. “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad.” International Journal oj Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13 (fall 2000): 265-300.
Hood, William, James Nolan, and Samuel Halpern. Myths Surrounding James Angleton: Lessons for American Courrterintelligence. Washington, D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Working Group on Intelligence Reform, 1994.
Johnson, William R. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer. Bethesda, Md.: Stone Trail Press, 1987.
Masterman, J. C. The Double-Cross System. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
National Counterintelligence Executive. The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States. NCIX Publication No. 2005-10007, March 2005.
_______. The National Counterintelligence Strategy