Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [124]
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CHAPTER 8
COVERT ACTION
COVERT ACTION, along with spying, is a mainstay of popular ideas about intelligence. Like spying, covert action is fraught with myths and misconceptions. Even when understood, it remains one of the most controversial intelligence topics.
Covert action is defined in the National Security Act as “[a]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”
Some intelligence specialists have objected to the phrase “covert action,” believing that the word “covert” emphasizes secrecy over policy. (The British had earlier referred to this activity as special political action—SPA.) The distinction is important, because even though these activities are secret, they are undertaken as one means to advance policy goals. This cannot be stressed enough. Proper covert actions are undertaken because policy makers have determined that they are the best way to achieve a desired end. These operations do not—or should not—proceed on the initiative of the intelligence agencies.
During the Carter administration (1977-1981), which exhibited some qualms about force as a foreign policy tool, the innocuous and somewhat comical phrase “special activity” was crafted to replace “covert action.” The administration thus substituted a euphemism with a euphemism. But when the Reagan administration came into office, with different views on intelligence policy, it continued to use “special activity” in its executive orders governing intelligence.
Ultimately, what covert activities are called should not matter that much. What is significant is that in making changes in appellation the United States reveals a degree of official discomfort with the tool.
The classic rationale behind covert action is that policy makers need a third option (yet another euphemism) between doing nothing (the first option) in a situation in which vital interests may be threatened and sending in military force (the second option), which raises a host of difficult political issues. Not everyone would agree with this rationale, including those who would properly argue that diplomatic activity is more than doing nothing without resorting to force.
As with counterintelligence, a pertinent question is whether covert action was a product of the cold war and whether it remains relevant today. Covert action became—under the leadership of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles during the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961)—an increasingly attractive option (see chap. 2). It had both successes and failures but was seen as a useful tool in a broad-based struggle with the Soviet Union. In the post-cold war period, situations could arise—involving proliferators, terrorists, or narcotics traffickers—in which some sort of covert action might be the preferred means of action.
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Covert action makes sense—and should be undertaken—only when tasked by duly authorized policy makers in pursuit of specific policy goals that cannot be achieved by any other means. Covert action cannot substitute