Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [147]
The argument made in favor of changing DCIs (now DNIs) when a new administration takes office is that presidents must have an intelligence community leader with whom they are comfortable. But back in the days of a nonpartisan DCI, many people in Washington, D.C., emphasized the professional nature of the DCI (even DCIs who were not career intelligence officers) and had the sense that intelligence is in some way different from the rest of the structure that each president inherits and fills with political appointees. An objective intelligence community was not to be part of the partisan spoils of elections. The shift since 1977 has affected the policy-intelligence relationship by tagging DCIs—and now, presumably, DNIs—with a partisan coloration. The shift has also meant a movement away from professional intelligence officers serving as DCls. Although professionals were not the only people tapped in the past, their selection may be less likely in the future. The new intelligence legislation requires that the DNI “shall have extensive national security expertise.” No further definition is provided, and the wording is purposely vague enough to allow a range of possible nominees.
Finally, external intrusions, particularly that of the electronic news media, can have an effect on the relationship. Contrary to popular belief, television news does not foster major changes in policy. It does serve as a means of communication for states and their leaders, and it competes with the intelligence community as an alternative source of information. The media do occasionally scoop the intelligence community. This is not because they know things that the intelligence community does not. Instead, the electronic media—especially the twenty-four-hour news networks—put a premium on speed and have the capacity and willingness to provide updates and corrections as necessary. The intelligence community does not have the same luxury and tends to take more time in preparing its initial report. Being scooped by the media can lead policy makers to believe, mistakenly, that the media offer much the same coverage as the intelligence community—and at greater speed and less cost.
Although a number of issues are likely to create tension between policy makers and the intelligence community, conflict is not the mainstay of the policy-intelligence relationship. Close and trusting working relationships prevail between policy makers and intelligence officers at all levels. But a good working relationship is not a given, and it cannot be fully appreciated without understanding all of the potential sources of friction.
FURTHER READINGS
Despite its centrality to the intelligence process, the policy maker-intelligence relationship has not received as much attention as other parts of the process.
Betts, Richard K. “Policy Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate. or Indifference?” lnlelligence and National Security 3 (January 1988): 184-189.
Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence. Intelligenre and Policy: The Evolving Relationship. Washington, D.C.:CIA. June 2004.
David, Jack. Analytic Professionalism and the Policymaking Process: Q&A on a (hallenging Relationship. Vol. 2, no. 4. Washington, D.C.: CIA. Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, October 2003.
Heymann, Hans. “Intelligence/Policy Relationships.” In Intelligence: Policy and Process. Ed. Alfred C. Maurer and others. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.
Hughes, Thomas L. The Fate of Facts in a Wnrld of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence Making. New York: l’oreign Policy