Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [148]
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CHAPTER 10
OVERSIGHT AND ACC0UNTABILITY
SED QUIS CUSTODIET IPSO CUSTODES? CUSTOTED? (“But who will guard the guards?”), the Roman poet and satirist Juvenal asked. The oversight of intelligence has always been a problem. The ability to control information is an important power in any state, whether democratic or despotic. Information that is unavailable by any other means and whose dissemination is often restricted is the mainstay of intelligence. By controlling information; by having expertise in surveillance, eavesdropping, and other operations; and by operating behind a cloak of secrecy, an intelligence apparatus has the potential to threaten heads of government. Thus, government leaders’ ability to oversee intelligence effectively is vital.
In democracies, oversight tends to be a responsibility shared by the executive and legislative powers. The oversight issues are generic: budget, responsiveness to policy needs, the quality of analysis, control of operations, propriety of activities. The United States is unique in giving extensive oversight responsibilities and powers to the legislative branch. The parliaments of other nations have committees devoted to intelligence oversight, but none has the same broad oversight powers as Congress. (See box, “A Linguistic Aside: The Two Meanings of Oversight. ”)
EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT ISSUES
The core oversight issue is whether the intelligence community is properly carrying out its functions, that is, whether the community is asking the right questions, responding to policy makers’ needs, being rigorous in its analysis, and having on hand the right operational capabilities (collection and covert action). Policy makers cannot trust the intelligence community alone to answer for itself. At the same time, senior policy officials (the national security adviser, the secretaries of state and defense, the president) cannot maintain a constant vigil over the intelligence community. Outside of the intelligence community, the National Security Council (NSC) Office of Intelligence Programs is the highest level organization within the executive branch that provides day-to-day oversight and policy direction of intelligence. Of course, as was discussed in the previous chapter, policy makers may have strong views about the quality of intelligence based on their own policy preferences, so they may not always be objective, either.
Although the 2004 intelligence reform law created a Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) to improve oversight, DNI Mike McConnell evidently found that the JICC did not meet his needs. He created the Executive Committee (EXCOM). The EXCOM is, like the JICC, a mixed policy/intelligence body, comprising both the heads of intelligence components and senior policy officials, usually at the undersecretary level. This slightly lower representation by policy departments is probably an advantage, because undersecretaries