Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [149]
A LINGUISTIC ASIDE: THE TWO MEANINGS OF OVERSIGHT
Oversight has two definitions that are distinct, if not opposites.
• Supervision; watchful care (as in “We have oversight of that activity.”)
• Failure to notice or consider (as in “We missed that. It was an oversight. ”)
In overseeing intelligence, Congress and the executive try to carry out the first definition and to avoid the second.
Since the 1953-1961 administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower (with two brief lapses), presidents have relied on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to carry out higher level and more objective oversight than the NSC Office of Intelligence Programs does. PFIAB members are appointed by the president and usually include former senior intelligence and policy officials and individuals with relevant commercial backgrounds. (In the 1990s some people were appointed to PFIAB largely as political favors.) PFIAB can respond to problems (such as the investigation of alleged Chinese spying at Los Alamos National Laboratory) or can initiate activities (such as the Team A-Team B competitive analysis on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions).
The PFIAB’s relationship to policy makers can be subject to the same strains that are seen in the relationship between policy makers and intelligence agencies. From 2001 to 2005, PFIAB was chaired by Brent Scowcroft, who had served as national security adviser under Presidents Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977) and George H. W. Bush (1989-1993). Scowcroft spoke out against the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, which surprised some people given his previous close working relationship with George H. W. Bush. In 2005, President George W. Bush replaced Scowcroft, apparently displeased over his remarks. This was the first time that the chairman of PFIAB was replaced because of a policy disagreement with the White House.
The executive branch has tended to focus its oversight on issues related to espionage and covert action, although analytical issues (Team A-Team B, the September 11 terrorist attacks) are occasionally investigated. Espionage oversight is inclined to concentrate on lapses, such as the Aldrich Ames spy case or allegations of Chinese espionage. For example, in 1999 PFIAB issued a scathing report on Department of Energy security practices related to Chinese espionage. As with all other activities, executive branch organizations divide responsibility for overseeing covert action. The president is responsible for approving all covert actions, but the day-to-day responsibility for managing them resides with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Clandestine Service (NCS), formerly the Directorate of Operations (DO).
One oversight issue relating to covert action centers on the operating concept of plausible deniability. In the case of large-scale paramilitary operations—such as the Bay of Pigs or the contras in Nicaragua—deniability is somewhat implausible. But many covert actions are much smaller in scale, making it possible to deny plausibly any U.S. role. Some critics of covert action argue that plausible deniability undermines accountability by giving operators an increased sense