Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [152]
One final area of executive branch oversight has become more controversial in recent years. This is the role played by inspectors general, particularly the CIA inspector general (IG). Every cabinet department, every major agency, and several small ones have an IG. All lGs essentially have the same function: to ensure that their department or agency is operating within legal guidelines, effectively carrying out its mission and not engaging in activities that are unlawful, wasteful, or criminal. The CIA has had an IG since 1952; the position was given a statutory basis in 1989. The CIA IG must be confirmed by the Senate, making this IG one of the few intelligence officials below the level of agency director that requires Senate confirmation. The CIA IG reports to the director of the CIA, but the director has limited authority to constrain or limit the IG. If the director acts to limit the IG’s activities, for reasons of national security, the director must inform the two intelligence oversight committees about why. Only the president can remove the CIA IG and, again, the president must also inform the intelligence committees of the reasons for doing so. Thus, to the extent possible, Congress tried to give the CIA IG a fair amount of independence.
As noted elsewhere, in December 2002, Congress ordered the CIA IG, John Helgerson, to prepare an “accountability report” on the CIA’s performance before 9/11. The completed report, which went to DCIA Porter Goss in June 2005, found that the CIA and its officers “did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.” The report also found systemic problems in how the CIA addressed the terrorism issue and criticized specifically the performance of DCI George Tenet. Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt, and the then-chief of the Counterterrorist Center J. Cofer Black. These individuals were particularly faulted for not devoting enough resources to the terrorism issue and for inadequate follow-through, points that Tenet has refuted. The report recommended that DCIA Goss convene accountability review boards to assess their performance, a step before any disciplinary action can be taken. However, Goss declined to do so, saying this would wrongly single out individuals for what were larger problems and would send the wrong signal at a time when he was urging officers to take risks. Needless to say, Goss’s decision was criticized by members of Congress and others.
The report remained classified until August 2007, when DCIA Hayden, who had replaced Goss in May 2006, released it as required by new legislation. Hayden made it clear that he opposed the release of the report. His statement also seemed to praise those cited in the report and to question the utility of the IG’s hindsight. Hayden wrote, “The summary, like the complete report, is a very human document. In it, one group of agency officers—dedicated to their task—looks back to examine and judge the actions of another group of agency officers—dedicated to their task, the task of understanding and combating al-Qai’da.”
This might have ended the issue, but in October 2007, Hayden ordered a review of the CIA IG’s office, voicing concerns about its fairness and impartiality when it reviewed the terrorist detention and interrogation programs. Congressional reaction was predictably negative, with some accusing Hayden of setting the review in motion as a way of forcing Helgerson to curtail his activities. According to press accounts, officers involved in these programs felt they were prosecuted rather than investigated. Former CIA general counsel Jeffrey Smith also noted the dissonance involved for officers who are told by the general counsel that a program is legal and then find themselves being investigated for conducting that program. Smith also noted the difference between operational decisions made under pressure and the hindsight of an IG review. Smith’s comments