Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [153]
As could be expected, Hayden’s review aroused concerns in Congress that an oversight mechanism was being stifled. In early 2008, Hayden informed CIA employees that the CIA IG had agreed to the appointment of a special ombudsman to oversee his work, as well as a “quality control officer” who would ensure that “exculpatory and relevant mitigating information” was also included in IG reports, as well as more rapidly conducted investigations.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Congress approaches intelligence oversight—and all oversight issues, whether national security or domestic—from a different but equally legitimate perspective from that of the executive branch.
The concept of congressional oversight is established in the Constitution. Article I, Section 8, paragraph 18, states, “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Courts have found that the Necessary and Proper Clause includes the power to require reports from the executive on any subject that can be legislated. The essence of congressional oversight is the ability to gain access to information, usually held by the executive, which is relevant to the functioning of the government.
Apart from its constitutional mandate, a major factor driving Congress in all matters of oversight is the desire to be treated by the executive as an equal branch of government. This is not always easy to achieve, as the executive branch ultimately speaks with one voice, that of the president, while Congress has 535 members. The significant difference leads some people to question whether Congress’s constitutional authority works in reality.
Moreover, in the area of national security, Congress has often given presidents a fair amount of leeway to carry out their responsibilities as commander in chief. This is not to suggest that partisan debates do not arise over national security or even intelligence issues, such as the 1960 allegations about a missile gap or the 1970s allegations about a strategic window of vulnerability (see chap. 2). To the contrary, debate has become more partisan in the post-cold war period.
Congress has several levers that it can use to carry out its oversight functions.
BUDGET. Control over the budget for the entire federal government is the most fundamental lever of congressional oversight. Article I, Section 9, paragraph 7, of the Constitution states, “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
The congressional budget process is complex and duplicative. It is composed of two major activities: authorization and appropriation. Authorization consists of approving specific programs and activities. [See chap. 3 for the programs that make up the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP).] Authorizing committees also suggest dollar amounts for the programs. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are the primary authorizers of the intelligence budget. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees authorize some defense-related intelligence programs. Appropriation consists of allocating specific dollar amounts to authorized programs. The defense subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees perform this function for intelligence.
CONGRESSIONAL HUMOR: AUTHORIZERS VERSUS APPROPRIATORS
The tension between those who sit on authorizing committees and those who sit on appropriations committees is pithily characterized by a joke often heard on Capitol Hill:
“Authorizes think they are gods; appropriators know they are gods.