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the interventionist party. In the post-cold war period, a renascent noninterventionist faction grew within the Republican Party. After September 2001, wide support emerged for both military and intelligence operations abroad, although this unraveled, largely as a result of Iraq. But as the effort in Iraq became protracted, the two parties appear to have largely resumed their post-Vietnam stances of noninterventionist Democrats and interventionist Republicans. Iraq, like Vietnam, will likely engender a set of“lessons” that will be applied—rightly or wrongly—to the next foreign policy debate.

Finally, the immigrant basis of the U.S. population is reflected in foreign policy debates. Every region of the world and virtually every nation are represented within the U.S. population. U.S. policies or actions around the world—reat, planned, or rumored—are likely to stir reactions from some segment of the population and perhaps even different reactions. Members of Congress having ethnic ties to a region or representing constituents who do are also likely to voice opinions.

CONCLUSION

The nature of congressional oversight of intelligence changed dramatically in 1975-1976. Although Congress may go through periods of greater or lesser activism, it is unlikely to return to the laissez-faire style of oversight. Congress has become a consistent player in shaping intelligence policy.

This seems novel in the case of intelligence only because it is relatively recent. Congress has played the same activist role in all other areas of policy since adoption of the Constitution, and its role is inherent in the checks and balances system that the framers set up. The willful division of power creates a system that is a constant “invitation to struggle.”

The oversight system is, of necessity, adversarial but does not have to be hostile. Any system that divides power is bound to have debates and friction. But they do not have to be played out in an antagonistic manner. When antagonism arises, it is more often the effect of personalities, issues, and partisanship than the oversight system per se.

KEY TERMS

appropriated but not authorized

appropriation

authorization

executive order

Gang of 4

Gang of 8

global finding

hollow budget authority

no year appropriations

oversight

supplemental appropriations

U.S. person

FURTHER READINGS

The expansion of the role of Congress as an overseer has been matched by an increasing number of books and articles on the topic. This chapter also discusses executive oversight issues, which are covered in the first entry.

Adler, Emanuel. “Executive Command and Control in Foreign Policy: The CIA’s Covert Activities.” Orbis 23 (1959): 671-696.

Barrett, David M. The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2005.

Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress? Congressional Research Service Report RL33733. Washington, D.C., November 21, 2006.

_____. Intelligence Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report RL33539. Washington, D.C., October 16, 2007 [updated periodically].

Central Intelligence Agency. OIG Report on CIA Accountability with Ruspect to the 9/11 Attacks. Executive Summary. June 2005. (Available at www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive%20Summary_OIG%20Report.pdf.)

Cohen, William S. “Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2 (summer 1988): 155-162.

Colton, David Everett. “Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight in an Imperfect World.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 137 (December 1988): 571-613.

Conner, William E. Intelligence Oversight: The Controversy behind the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. McLean, Va.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993.

Currie, James. “Iran-Contra and Congressional Oversight of the CIA.” International Journal of Intelligenre and Counterintelligence 11 (summer 1998): 185-210.

Davis, Christopher M. 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic