Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [172]
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CHAPTER 11
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENDA: NATION STATES
TO SOME EXTENT a distinction between nation state targets and transnational issues is artificial: nation states are not of interest per se. They are of interest because of their activities. The nature of our interest in them varies with the state of our relations with them and by the nature of their activities. For example, the U.S. intelligence community is interested in Russia’s political system, its military forces, its energy policy, and so forth because it is an important international player, a rival, and a potential threat. In the case of Britain the United States does not have concerns about their political system, although we are deeply interested in who is prime minister and the policies he or she will follow. The United States is interested in the British military as an allied force rather than as a rival. There are also several small and remote countries in which the United States would have few, if any, intelligence interests at all.
Conversely, the transnational issues about which the United States is most concerned do not exist in the abstract. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, crime, narco-trafficking, and the like all occur in nation states—either with or without the cooperation of the host government. Even when dealing with nongovernmental actors, such as terrorist cells, they have to exist someplace. James Clapper, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence (2007- ) and the former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) put it succinctly when he said, “Intelligence is not just about things and not just about places. It is about things in places.” This is why the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) that has been in place since 2003 was seen as such a breakthrough: It allowed policy makers and intelligence officers to identify