Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [185]
Finally, one must give some intelligence attention to one’s allies and friends. Will NATO remain engaged in Afghanistan? How will the European Union (EU) behave as an economic rival even as its members remain military allies? Again, we are looking more at intentions than at capabilities.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the nation state issues that policy makers and intelligence officers face. It does suggest several problems for intelligence. First, there is no longer any ability or rationale for focusing on a single state as the United States did during the cold war. This means that priorities must be more finely drawn and that more difficult allocations of collection and analytical resources must be made. It also means that a more diverse workforce must be recruited, with broader regional knowledge, including languages. Again, the massive focus on the Soviet issue is a long dead model. It is also important to look more critically at the levers of power that each state has. Some of these, such as the economic lever, have built-in dependencies, as was noted above, that serve to limit their use. It is also important to be alert to opportunities for influence and for change as well as to sudden shifts in alignments. As Lord Palmerston (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1855-1858: 1859-1865) noted, “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.”
KEY TERMS
bean counting
capabilities versus intentions
containment
failed state
maskirovka
Potemkin villages
Reagan Doctrine
self-reveal
worst-case analysis
FURTHER READINGS
As might be expected, the literature on U.S. intelligence regarding the Soviet Union is rich. The readings listed here include some older pieces that are of historical value.
Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Jeffrey T. Richelson. “The CIA Vindicated: The Soviet Collapse Was Predicted. ” National Interest 41 (fall 1995): 36-47.
Burton, Donald F. “Estimating Soviet Defense Spending.” Problems of Communism 32 (March-April 1983): 85-93.
Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff. At Cold War’s End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 1989-1991. Washington. D.C.: CIA, 1999.
Firth, Noel E. Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates. 1950-1990. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1998.
Freedman, Lawrence. “The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The Politicization of Estimates. 1966-1977.” Intelligence and National Security 12 January 1997): 122-142.
______. U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977.
Koch, Scott A., ed. Selected Estimates on the, Soviet Union. 1950-1959. Washington, D.C.: History Staff, CIA. 1993.
Lee. William T. Understanding the Soviet Military Threat. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977.
Lowenthal, Mark M. “Intelligence Epistemology: Dealing with the Unbelievable.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6(1993):319-325.
MacEachin, Douglas J. CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record vs. the Charges. Langley. Va.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1996.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Secrecy: The American Experience. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Pipes. Richard. “Team B: The Reality behind the Myth.” Commentary 82 (October 1986): 25-40.
Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence and Russian Military Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982.
Reich, Robert C. “Re-examining the Team A-Team B Exercise.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3 (fall 1989): 387-403.
Steury, Donald P., ed. CIA ’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991. Washington, D.C.: History