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A problem with setting truth as a goal is that it has a relentless quality. Most individuals understand the importance of being honest most of the time (and acknowledge the occasional need to at least shade the truth). But ifan analyst’s goal is to tell the truth—especially to those in power who might not want to hear it—then there is no room for compromise, no possible admission of alternative views. After all, if one has the truth, those who disagree must have falsehood. Thus, an analyst cannot compromise with other analysts whose views may differ, even slightly. Moreover, what should a truth-teller do if the powerful reject his or her analysis, as they are free to do? Once the powerful have failed to accept the truth, is their legitimacy at stake?

These questions may seem far-fetched, but they underscore the problems raised by truth-telling as a job description. As noble as it may be as a goal, as a practical matter, truth-telling raises many problems in an already complex intelligence and policy process.

ANALYTIC PRESSURES. Assume that the role of intelligence is not to tell the truth but to provide informed analysis to policy makers to aid their decision making.

Even with this less demanding role, analysts can reach judgments that are based on deep and strongly held beliefs. They may be convinced not only of the conclusions they have reached but also of the importance of the issue for the nation. What should they do if their views are rejected, disregarded, or ignored by their policy clients?

• Accept the situation as the policy maker’s prerogative and move on to the next issue?

• Attempt to raise the issue again with the policy maker, based on the possibility that the policy maker misunderstood the importance of the issue and the analysis? How often can analysts do this, either on one particular issue or as a regular practice? How does this behavior affect their credibility?

• Try to take their analysis to other policy makers, either going over the head of their original client or elsewhere in the policy process? Even if this ploy is successful, what is the cost to the analysts’ relationship with the original and all other policy clients?

• Threaten to quit? Is the issue that important? Are the analysts willing to carry out the threat or risk the loss of credibility? What does quitting accomplish beyond a protest?

The multioffice or multiagency nature of intelligence analysis raises many issues of group dynamics (see chap. 6). Analyses are often the product of negotiation and compromise among several analysts with differing views. An analyst needs to consider a number of questions.

• To what extent should an analyst be willing to compromise with other analysts? Which types of trades are acceptable and which are not?

• At what point do the compromises affect the integrity of the document? If the compromises appear to have jeopardized its utility or integrity, can an analyst go back on previous compromises?

• Can an analyst warn policy makers that, in her view, the analysis has been overly compromised? In other words, at what point should an analyst feel obligated to break free of the procedural constraints of the multiagency process and venture out as a lone wolf? What types of issues merit this behavior? What is the likelihood of efficacy? What are the costs in terms of future working relationships within this process, even if one wins his or her point? Will there be an inevitable and irreplaceable loss of trust that makes all future interactions difficult at best?

Finally, the nature of the relationship between the intelligence officer and the policy maker is an issue. When Sherman Kent stated that the analyst wants to be believed or listened to, he was mainly referring to the quality of the analysis. However, an analyst’s access also depends on the nature of the relationship itself.

• How great a concern, if any, should the relationship be for an analyst? Should an analyst avoid stands that would alienate policy makers to keep open the best lines of communication?