Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [219]
• What if the analyst strongly believes that he or she must take a stand? Again, should the stand be tempered for the sake of the long-term relationship with policy makers?
• Alternatively, what should an analyst do in the face of pressure to produce intelligence that is perhaps more supportive of policy? Such a request may be subtle, not overt. Can, and should, the intelligence officer resist outright? How many small compromises add up to large ones that politicize the product? What if the analyst knows that the policy maker will write a memo with contrary views and will ultimately prevail? Is it still worth resisting blandishments, knowing she will lose both the argument and perhaps access to a key policy client as well?
Many games are being played simultaneously: the intelligence process itself, the policy process, and the desire of the intelligence officers to have access to policy makers and to keep their funding levels safe and preferably growing. It is easy, in the abstract, to declare that the integrity of the intelligence process is primary. In the trenches, however, such a declaration is not always so obvious or so appealing.
ANALYSTS’ OPTIONS. An intelligence analyst may believe that something fundamental is at stake, that neither compromise nor silence is possible. What are the analyst’s options then? They boil down to two: continue the struggle from within the system or quit. (See box, “Analysts’ Options: A Cultural Difference. Continuing the struggle from within is appealing in that one’s professional standards are preserved. But is it a realistic choice or a rationalization? Are there real prospects of continuing to fight for that viewpoint from within the bureaucratic system? For whatever reason, the viewpoint did not prevail either in the intelligence community or with policy makers. Short of capitulation, the analyst is now tagged with a certain view that has been found wanting. How influential will he or she be on this issue in the future? Or is the analyst, not wishing to abandon a chosen career, simply putting the best gloss on having lost? If such choices must be made, the analyst can only hope to make them over an issue of some significance. Not every issue is worth engaging at this level.
ANALYSTS’ OPTIONS: A CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
The two options for analysts who find they cannot compromise-fighting from within or quoting-tend to play out differently in the bureaucracies of Britain and the United States. In Britain, a strong tradition exists of quitting in protest To cite a high-level example, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden resigned in February 1958 when he disagreed with Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement toward Nazi Germany. In the United States resignation is rarer, with individuals opting instead to fight from within Nothing definitive accounts for the difference Several U.S. civil servants did resign, however, during the early stages of the civil war in Bosnia to protest the lack of action by the United States
Alternatively, the analyst can quit. Honor and professional standards are preserved intact. But by quitting, the analyst abandons all hope of further influencing the process. Yes, one can attempt to influence policy from outside the government, but such attempts are rarely effective. The analyst who quits has, in effect, conceded the field to those with a different viewpoint.
OVERSIGHT-RELATED ISSUES
The demands of oversight raise ethical issues for witnesses before Congress and for the members and staff as well.
THE HELMS DILEMMA. In 1973, while testifying first before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session and then before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in an open session, DCI Richard Helms (1966-1973) was asked if the CIA had been involved in operations to overthrow the Allende government in Chile. Helms said that the CIA had not been involved. In 1977, the justice Department considered a charge of perjury against Helms for his false testimony. After negotiations, Helms agreed to