Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [227]
The main goal is some modicum of collection efficiency and improved resource management. However, the suggested solution would create a large entity, one whose inherent power might rival that of the DNI. Cooperation has been growing between the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), although still far from the point of a merger of any sort.
Some have suggested that the two HUMINT components—the CIA’s National Clandestine Service (formerly the Directorate of Operations, DO) and the Defense Humint Service of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA/DH—Defense Humint)—be unified, also to avoid duplication. Recognition of the need to improve coordination among the various HUMINT collectors—which include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the military services as well as the CIA and DIA—was the impetus behind DCI Porter Goss’s creation of the National Clandestine Service (replacing the old Directorate of Operations), which includes a deputy to coordinate HUMINT across the intelligence community. For the time being, the decision appears to be in favor of improved coordination but continuation of separate HUMINT efforts, which permits a broader and more diverse HUMINT collection effort. Along similar lines, some have proposed that the clandestine services (HUMINT and covert action) be a separate agency, either to improve management responsibility or to avoid contaminating analysis, or both. Sen. Pat Roberts, R., Kans., made such a proposal in 2004, at the outset of the debate over the new intelligence structure. judging by the reaction Roberts received, it is fair to say that very few support this concept, although it is not as radical as it is often portrayed, replicating, as it does, the British structure.
In the area of collection, open-source intelligence (OSINT) is a specific reform issue. OSINT was long underutilized and had no strong organizational locus. Reformers have advanced several ideas to improve the role of OSINT, including creating an OSINT agency or office or contracting out stronger OSINT services. The common goal is to elevate OSINT to a full-standing INT that is readily available to all analysts, as opposed to the more random situation that currently exists. One of the DNI’s first responsibilities was to report to Congress on the future of OSINT and the possibility of creating a separate OSINT agency. The WMD Commission (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction) recommended creating an Open Source Directorate at CIA. DNI Negroponte created an Open Source Center (OSC), which was largely a renaming of the old Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which had long been the leading OSINT producer. Negroponte gave management responsibility for the OSC to the CIA, which made sense given that FBIS had long been part of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). However, this left the OSC open to criticism that it was old wine in new bottles. The DNI’s office and OSC have gone to great pains to show that there is now an increased reliance on and better utility of OSINT in intelligence products, including the President’s Daily Brief(PDB) and National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), such as the Iran WMD NIE. Today OSINT probably has greater visibility than has been the case for many years, but it is not clear if it has the kind of bureaucratic backing within the DNI’s office or in Congress that many believe are necessary.
Two final collection issues that are part of the reform debate have already been discussed: the balance between HUMINT and the technical intelligence (TECHINT) and the need for improved TPEDs (tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination).
Turning to analysis, the main issues highlighted in the 2004 legislation were ways to improve the oversight of intelligence at the DNI level in terms of timeliness, objectivity, and quality of analysis