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as well as to foster more alternative analysis. Similar issues were discussed in the 2005 WMD Commission report. Although the goals are worthy, underlying the provisions may be a changing view about the acceptable tolerances within which intelligence analysis exists. Coming up with reliable standards for assessing the quality of analysis is difficult (see chap. 6). An obvious but stark one would be “right or wrong.” The problem with this standard is that most analytical issues play out over time, during which some analytical judgments are right and some are wrong. The analytical standards promulgated by the office of the deputy DNI for analysis recognize this time lag problem. In the end, creating a balance sheet could be possible, but doing so would be secondary in importance to whether policy goals were met over that period. The intelligence community’s experience with the Soviet Union is instructive. Over the forty-four years that the intelligence community spent analyzing the Soviet Union, it made numerous analytical judgments. Again, some were right and some were wrong. The wrong judgments, although problematic, never put U.S. security at risk. More important, however, is that U.S. policy, supported by intelligence, succeeded and the Soviet Union collapsed. Part of the problem is perceptual. By virtue of the issues they address and the highly charged political atmosphere in which they now exist, most attention goes to NIEs. These are high-value analytical products, although they have not tended to be influential in terms of policy making. A great deal of the intelligence community’s analytical effort takes place at a lower, more constant level, providing daily intelligence support to a broad range of policy makers.

But September 11 and Iraq WMD, for example, reflect a starker situation. Despite multiple warnings about al Qaeda hostility and intentions, no specific intelligence warning was possible about the terrorist attacks. Many have noted that the threads of intelligence make sense only in hindsight, but a body of opinion sees September 11 as a right-or-wrong issue. The discussion may be on firmer ground with Iraq WMD. The situation on the ground did not reflect prewar estimates. Although, as DCI Tenet pointed out in his 2004 speech at Georgetown University, parts of the estimate were borne out, both over- and underestimative judgments were made, and overall the analysis was not correct. But does this argue for the acceptability or the wider utility of a right-or-wrong standard? The fear among some in the intelligence community is that little tolerance now exists for anything other than absolutely correct intelligence judgments and that the new provisions regarding analysis reflect this view. If so, then the intelligence community is doomed to fail, as it will never achieve success in a right-or-wrong system. It is also difficult, although probably necessary, to have a discussion about how right analysis can or should be. The answer is “right as often as possible.” But the key to that answer is the word “possible.” A level of reasonable expectations of intelligence analysis may have been lost and will be difficult to regain.

The 2007 NIE on Iran’s WMD program is seen by many as the “antidote” to the Iraq NIE. Based on background briefings given by senior officials in the DNI’s office, there were “lessons learned” from the Iraq experience. These largely have to do with more intense vetting of intelligence sources, especially the new intelligence that led to a reversal of views from the 2005 NIE on the weaponization aspects only of Iran’s nuclear activities, and more rigorous uses of various competitive methodologies. These are all to the good. However, they do not necessarily mean that the Iran estimate is more likely to be correct than was the Iraq estimate. As noted earlier, the intense use of NIEs by partisans in both parties and in both the executive branch and Congress will make it increasingly difficult for analysts to make “tough” calls without fearing that not only their work but their motives for having