Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [233]
OTHER REFORM CONCEPTS. Among the many other proposals for intelligence reform, a market-based intelligence community has been advocated. Proponents argue that intelligence currently exists as an essentially free benefit for policy makers, which undercuts its value to them. In part, this view may stem from the intelligence community’s habit of referring to policy makers as clients or customers. Such usage represents an effort to indicate the closeness of the relationship, but it also implies a type of relationship that may not be apt. Policy makers could be more of a captive audience than they are customers. Market advocates take the term “customer” literally. They believe that if policy makers had a better understanding of the true costs of intelligence—in terms of collection, analysis, and so on—they could make more informed decisions about the specific intelligence they wanted, for which they would then be charged. Presumably, policy agencies would have intelligence expense budgets that could be spent as they saw fit. In a variant of this proposal, a mixed economy has been suggested: Policy makers would receive a certain amount of intelligence without charge but would have to supply resources if greater intelligence support was desired.
Advocates of the idea have not yet fully developed it, so considering all the questions it raises may be unfair. The underlying premise—market competition will make intelligence more efficient and more competitive—might work in some respects for issues that are currently high on the policy agenda. However, how one would handle the sudden unexpected crisis or maintain some level of expertise on less pressing issues is not clear.
The market concept also flies in the face of some generic aspects of intelligence, especially for collection. Determining the cost of collecting against specific issues is difficult, if not impossible. For example, a SIGINT or GEOINT satellite over Iraq may be collecting intelligence for support to military operations or on proliferation or regional stability. Similarly, over Afghanistan, one might collect for support to military operations or on terrorism or narcotics. How does one then determine the fair cost for any one issue?
A LAST THOUGHT: THE “LESSONS” OF SEPTEMBER 11 AND IRAQ WMD. Most would agree that the creation of the DNI and the other attendant changes in the intelligence community were the result of two successive events: September 11 and Iraq WMD. Both of these events have entered into popular legend as to the mistakes that were made and the necessary fixes. However, a critical examination of the “received” lessons of these two events (that is, those that are broadly agreed to in the press and among those individuals who pay attention to intelligence) reveals that they are almost diametrically opposed.
• Warning: The lesson of September 11 is to warn as stridently as possible to make sure that policy makers comprehend the gravity of the situation. But the lesson of Iraq WMD is to warn only when you are absolutely certain that the situation is real. You can warn extravagantly or cautiously but not both.
• Information sharing: The lesson of September 11 is that intelligence must be shared broadly across the intelligence community so that necessary connections can be made. But the lesson of Iraq WMD is to be careful and not share information that is dubious, such as the discredited reporting of the human source known as CURVEBALL.
• “Connect the Dots”: If we overlook the inappropriate relationship of this phrase to the work of intelligence, for the moment, we see that the lesson of September 11 is the need to connect the dots. But the lesson of Iraq WMD is not to connect too many dots and create a false picture.