Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [234]
These lessons assume that the intelligence analysts or managers know with a fair degree of certainty which intelligence is reliable and which is not. As has been stated throughout this book, this is often not the case. There is much hindsight in both sets of lessons. But the fact that the creation of the DNI is the result of these largely opposed impressionistic sets of lessons underscores the nature of many of the problems inherent in the DNI structure. There seems to have been a fairly uncritical assumption that September 11 and Iraq WMD represented similar types of lapses and, therefore, a uniform set of fixes could be applied. In reality, they were very different lapses calling for very different changes in how intelligence is structured and how it functions.
CONCLUSION
The intelligence reform debate has an inconclusive aspect, which reflects both the difficulty of the issues and choices involved and the boundless enthusiasm of reform advocates, particularly those outside the intelligence community.
Although improvements undoubtedly can be made in intelligence, determining how efficient an inherently inefficient and intellectual process can be remains elusive. A wide gulf exists between government-based reviews of the intelligence community, which largely tend to accept the status quo and thus suggest modest changes, and the more acerbic critiques offered by those wholly outside the system, many of whom are intelligence community veterans. Are these differences real, or do they reflect, to some extent, parochial prejudices? The executive branch has rarely shown enthusiasm for major reforms. At least three factors explain this. First, many, if not most, policy makers believe that their most important needs are usually met, so they are not deeply dissatisfied. Second, many proposals for reform would require greater involvement of policy makers, which they would prefer to avoid if only because they already have more than enough to do. Third, many policy makers understand some of the fragility of the intelligence community and fear the possibility of making things worse.
Furthermore, remember that intelligence is a government activity. Revolutionary proposals tend to be ignored or, at best, to be severely moderated before they are enacted.
What is certain is that the debate over intelligence reform will go on, largely on its own momentum, with heightened attention during crises or after incidents deemed to be intelligence failures.
FURTHER READINGS
Literature on intelligence reform is extensive but uneven. Many opinions and proposals are on offer, not all of which are practical, with a few hobbyhorses among them. The following readings include some of the more recent studies and some of the more thoughtful and practical works by knowledgeable observers.
Berkowitz, Bruce, and Allen Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Best, Richard A., Jr. Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 1996. (Appendix to IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century; see below.)
Betts, Richard K. “Fixing Intelligence.” foreign Affairs 81 (January-February 2002): 43-59.
Carter, Ashton. B. “The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism.” Internatinnal Serurity 26 (winter 2001-2002): 5-23.
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD Commission]. Report to the President of the United States. Washington, D.C., March 31, 2005.
Council on Foreign Relations. Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1996.
Eberstadt, Ferdinand. Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security. Report to James Forrestal, secretary of the Navy. Washington, D.C., 1945.
Hansen. James. “U.S. Intelligence Confronts the Future.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17 (winter 2004-2005): 674-709.
Hulnick. Arthur