Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [29]
The most important of the producers of finished intelligence are the three agencies responsible for producing all-source intelligence: CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), DIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and State’s INR. Within DOD, the four service intelligence offices also produce finished intelligence. The FBI has a relatively new Intelligence Directorate, which is also codified in the 2004 legislation. DHS has the undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis; Energy has its intelligence office. The DNI controls the National Intelligence Council, which is made up of the national intelligence officers (NIOs) and is responsible for national intelligence estimates (NIEs) and some other analyses. He or she also has responsibility for the National Counterterrorism Center, which produces analysis on all terrorism and counterterrorism issues, except those that are purely domestic, and the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), which “coordinates strategic planning” for WMD proliferation intelligence, identifies gaps or shortfalls in this area, and comes up with solutions for these gaps. Thus, the NCPC does not produce intelligence per se. Again, the DNI has authority to manage and task analysis.
The new law focuses much more on the analytic process. The DNI has three specific charges. First, the DNI is to create a process to ensure the use of alternative analysis as appropriate. Second, the DNI is to assign an official or office to be responsible for analytic integrity, which includes timeliness, objectivity, and the use of all appropriate sources and proper analytic tradecraft. Third, the DNI is to appoint someone who will oversee and report on the objectivity of analysis and the quality of its associated tradecraft. These mandates reflect the unstated Iraq-related issues that shaped the legislation, not September 11, which was the ostensible basis for the new law. In 2007 the assistant deputy DNI for Analytic Integrity and Standards released a set of standards for evaluating the quality of analysis (see chap. 6 for details).
Figure 3-3 does not delineate counterintelligence or counterespionage functions. Each agency has certain internal security responsibilities beyond the NCIX under the DNI. The FBI’s National Security Branch coordinates foreign counterintelligence activities in the United States. CIA’s NCS has its own counterintelligence and counterespionage components. In addition, the director of NSA is also the director of the Central Security Service, with responsibility for safeguarding the communications of the United States from interception. The basic relationships, strengths, and weaknesses noted in Figure 3-1 are still evident, but discerning functions is easier in Figure 3-3.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS THAT MATTER
Bureaucracies love organizational charts, popularly called “wiring diagrams.” All wiring diagrams, no matter how sophisticated, are deceptive. They portray where agencies sit in relation to one another, but they cannot portray how they interact and which relationships matter and why. Moreover, personalities do matter. However much people like to think of government as one of laws and institutions, the personalities and relationships of those filling important positions affect agency working relations.
THE DNI’S RELATIONSHIPS. The relationship between the DNI and the president is crucial for the institutional well-being of the intelligence community. The DNI is the embodiment of the intelligence community, and the president is the ultimate policy consumer. DCI Richard Helms (1966-1973) put it succinctly when he observed that the DCI’s authority derived directly from the perception that he had access to the president. The same is now true for the DNI, although