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Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [30]

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the DNI will have even more rivals than did the DCI. If the DNI does not have access and is not included in meetings where intelligence should be a contributor, there are several ramifications. For the DNI, the problem is personal and professional; for the intelligence community, the problem is being left out of the process. The role of the DNI thus would be diminished in the perception of others who become aware of the situation. The cases of some past DCIs are instructive. DCI John McCone (1961-1965) enjoyed good access to President John F. Kennedy and, initially, to Lyndon B. Johnson, but Johnson began to exclude McCone when the DCI disagreed with his incremental approach to the Vietnam War. After a short period of frustration, McCone resigned. Similarly, DCI R. James Woolsey (1993-1995), after his resignation, made no secret of the fact that he had little access to President Bill Clinton.

How close should the relationship between the DNI and the president be? Some observers worry that if it is too close, the DNI may lose some of the intelligence objectivity needed to support the policy process. Policy makers must be able to rely on the professionalism of the DNI. Still, if the intelligence community were forced to choose between the two extremes, an overly close relationship would probably be preferable to a very distant one. The relationship Tenet (1997-2004) had with George W. Bush was probably the closest of any DCI to a president, but it was also controversial. The intelligence provided on the eve of the war with Iraq in 2003 concerning the presence of WMDs is seen by some as an indicator of lost objectivity. However, a report issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee that was highly critical of intelligence analysis on Iraqi WMD also found that there was no evidence that intelligence had been politicized.

DNI McConnell’s relationship with the Bush administration came into question in August 2007, during his negotiations with Congress over a revision of the law controlling wire taps. This issue first arose when it was revealed in December 2005 that the Bush administration had been authorizing wire taps, which are permitted under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), without going to the special court set up under FISA to approve warrants. The administration had argued that this process was too time consuming. There was also the perception that the legal requirement for a court order (i.e., probable cause) might not be met in cases where there was “reasonable suspicion” and that waiting for probable cause might give suspected terrorists too much time to plan and perhaps act. (See chap. 12 for an in-depth discussion of this issue.) As both the president’s senior intelligence adviser and as a former director of NSA, McConnell was ideally suited to explain and to advocate the need for changes in the FISA law. According to some members of the House, McConnell reached an agreement with them but then insisted on different terms after the administration objected. Some members felt that McConnell had strayed into partisanship and argued that McConnell acted more as an advocate than as an expert.

The boundaries between expertise and advocacy or what constitutes partisan behavior remain vague. The DNI, like the DCI, serves at the pleasure of the president. Beyond the vague requirement of “extensive national security experience,” there are no professional qualifications given in the law for a candidate to become the DNI. Very few past DCIs were professional intelligence officers (Richard Helms, William Colby, Robert Gates). Some of the others had past intelligence experience (Allen Dulles, William Casey, George Tenet). All DCIs were chosen for a variety of political reasons. The same is true of the DNI. McConnell is a professional intelligence officer, but his predecessor, Negroponte, is a career diplomat. If a DNI is uncomfortable with a position taken by the administration or with a position that an administration advocates, the DNI can always resign. But the DNI cannot operate entirely independently

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