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By Root 651 0

CIA. Within the United States, increased rivalry has emerged over the recruitment of foreigners who are in the United States and are then sent overseas to collect intelligence. Although the CIA cannot conduct intelligence within the United States or on U.S. citizens, this type of activity has been allowed as the recruited individuals are foreigners and their collection takes place outside of the country. The FBI has reportedly sought to take over this activity, arguing that it is domestic intelligence (as recruitment takes place in the United States), and has sought to be responsible for disseminating intelligence produced by foreigners in the United States. The CIA has resisted the FBI efforts. Some observers note that the FBI has little experience in this type of intelligence recruitment and that its own intelligence analytic effort just began in 2003 and is not ready to take over reporting of this type. Concern also arose that both agencies could end up controlling some portion of overseas collection, resulting either in duplication or in the two working at cross-purposes if they are not aware of the other’s activities. The DNI has oversight over both sets of activities and may be asked to resolve the competing claims of the two agencies.

Rivalry also exists between DOD and the CIA. This relationship has always been difficult because of the imbalance between the DCI’s intelligence community responsibilities and the day-to-day control that the secretary of defense has exercised over some 75 to 80 percent of the intelligence community. Even though the new DCIA is responsible for only one agency, areas of rivalry remain. The blurring of intelligence and military roles in the war on terrorism has been one source. There are both overt and covert military aspects to this war. The CIA can claim to have a stake only in the covert aspect, as in its work with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. But the military can claim to have responsibilities in both spheres and appears to want to expand its activities in the covert sphere. (See the discussion of paramilitary operations in chap. 8.)

A second source of CIA-DOD competition was the apparent desire of DOD to gain greater control over any and all intelligence related to its missions. Several observers have noted that, once President George W. Bush decided to attack al Qaeda in its Afghan sanctuary, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was frustrated by the relative speed with which DCI Tenet was able to respond and begin inserting officers to link up with the Northern Alliance. DOD needed a much longer time span to plan and to deliver military combat units to Afghanistan. Rumsfeld was also reportedly displeased that the military had to depend largely on the CIA for human intelligence support.

In late 2004 and early 2005 a series of press reports indicated a unilateral expansion of DOD activities in intelligence. The fiscal year 2005 defense authorization bill included a provision allotting $25 million to the Special Operations Command to “support foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals.” Some believe this sounds like what the CIA has done and certainly did in Afghanistan. Some have questioned whether this puts DOD into the business of covert actions without the attendant legal apparatus of presidential findings and reports to Congress (for additional discussion, see chap. 8). The consensus is that the situation also raised the possibility that some of these foreigners might double dip, that is, solicit payments from both DOD and CIA. The WMD Commission had recommended that DOD be given greater authority for conducting covert action. However, according to press reports in June 2005, the Bush administration decided against the proposal. Within the NCS there is now an assistant director who coordinates all clandestine overseas HUMINT Collection.

More controversial were reports that DIA had created a Strategic Support Branch to augment its HUMINT capabilities. Again, this was seen as a way of minimizing DOD’s need to rely on the CIA for HUMINT.