Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [36]
INR AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. State’s INR is the smallest of the three all-source analytical components (compared with CIA and DIA) and is often thought of as the weakest. A great deal of INR’s ability to get things done, both in its own department and as a player in the intelligence community, depends on the relationship between the INR assistant secretary and the secretary of state and one or two other senior State officials, who often are referred to collectively as “the seventh floor,” where they are situated at the Department of State. In some respects, the relationship among these State officials parallels that between the DNI and the president. If INR has access to the seventh floor, then it plays a greater role and has greater bureaucratic support when needed. But it is a highly variable relationship, depending on the preferences of the secretary and key subordinates. For example, Secretary of State George P. Shultz (1982-1989) met with all of his assistant secretaries regularly; Secretary of State James A. Baker III (1989-1992) did not, preferring to meet with a few senior subordinates, who then dealt with the rest of the department. Thus, under Shultz, INR had more opportunities to gain access; under Baker, most of INR’s clients were other bureaus, but less so the vaunted seventh floor.
In recent years INR has taken a number of steps to increase its visibility in the State Department and to involve other bureaus more actively in setting intelligence requirements. The goal has been to increase the bureaus’ appreciation of the role of intelligence and of INR, thus making them potential sources of support. The degree to which these steps have improved INR’s position in its department remains to be seen.
NEW AREAS OF RIVALRY. Increased rivalry has become evident among agencies both before and after the passage of the 2004 intelligence legislation. The war on terrorism has been a major impetus to this rivalry for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the war on terrorism has blurred distinctions between different types or fields of activity that were kept distinct, at least in U.S. practice. Most prominent are those between foreign and domestic intelligence issues and between intelligence and military operations. As became evident in 2001, terrorists could place themselves in the United States legally to plan and conduct attacks, creating what is both a foreign and domestic intelligence issue. The war against terrorism, particularly in places such as Afghanistan, called for greater intelligence-military cooperation but also blurred some of the distinctions between the areas in which both operated. For example, the initial liaison with and support of the Northern Alliance, which was fighting the Taliban, came via the CIA. The campaign against the Taliban had conventional and nonconventional (that is, special forces) aspects, as well as a large intelligence component. The second reason for increased rivalry has been the natural tendency of most organizations to increase activities, particularly during periods of crisis or war.
Rivalry has been an issue between the FBI and the CIA. The FBI, beginning before 2001, sought to increase its role both within the United States and overseas. In the mid-1990s, the FBI was aggressive about expanding the role of its legal attaches, who work out of U.S. embassies to foster greater cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies. Press stories have alleged that the FBI has, on occasion, conducted overseas activities without informing the